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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
REGULATION OF SPEECH
INTERMEDIARIES
SHAUN B. SPENCER*
Calls to regulate social media platforms abound on both sides of the
political spectrum. Some want to prevent platforms from deplatforming users
or moderating content, while others want them to deplatform more users and
moderate more content. Both types of regulation will draw First Amendment
challenges. As Justices Thomas and Alito have observed, applying settled First
Amendment doctrine to emerging regulation of social media platforms presents
significant analytical challenges.
This Article aims to alleviate at least some of those challenges by isolating
the role of the speech intermediary in First Amendment jurisprudence. Speech
intermediaries complicate the analysis because they introduce speech interests
that may conflict with the traditional speaker and listener interests that First
Amendment doctrine evolved to protect. Clarifying the under-examined role of
the speech intermediary can help inform the application of existing doctrine in
the digital age. The goal of this Article is to articulate a taxonomy of speech
intermediary functions that will help courts (1) focus on which intermediary
functions are implicated by a given regulation and (2) evaluate how the mix of
speaker, listener, and intermediary interests should affect whether that
regulation survives a First Amendment challenge.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, it provides a taxonomy of the speech
intermediary functions—conduit, curator, commentator, and collaborator—
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and identifies for each function the potential conflict or alignment between the
intermediary’s speech interest and the speech interests of the speakers and
listeners the intermediary serves. Next, it maps past First Amendment cases
onto the taxonomy and describes how each intermediary’s function influenced
the application of First Amendment doctrine. Finally, it illustrates how the
taxonomy can help analyze First Amendment challenges to emerging
regulation of contemporary speech intermediaries.
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... 3
II. A TAXONOMY OF SPEECH INTERMEDIARY FUNCTIONS ............................. 10
A. Conduit ............................................................................................ 12
B. Curator ............................................................................................. 17
C. Commentator ................................................................................... 21
D. Collaborator..................................................................................... 23
III. MAPPING FIRST AMENDMENT CASES ONTO THE TAXONOMY OF SPEECH
INTERMEDIARY FUNCTIONS ................................................................. 24
A. Conduit ............................................................................................ 25
i. Proxy-Censor Regulations ......................................................... 25
ii. Must-Carry Regulations............................................................ 26
B. Curator ............................................................................................. 34
i. Proxy-Censor Regulations ......................................................... 34
ii. Must-Carry Regulations............................................................ 42
C. Commentator ................................................................................... 47
D. Collaborator..................................................................................... 51
IV. APPLYING THE TAXONOMY TO EMERGING REGULATION OF SPEECH
INTERMEDIARIES .................................................................................. 55
A. Neutrality Obligations for Social Media Platforms and Companies
Further Down the “Stack” ............................................................ 56
B. Social Media Platform Liability for Various Types of Harmful
Content .......................................................................................... 65
C. Mandatory Social Media Platform Notices and Warnings .............. 67
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 70

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

REGULATION OF SPEECH INTERMEDIARIES

3

I. INTRODUCTION
We love to hate social media platforms.1 There is widespread agreement
that they are doing a terrible job, yet sharp disagreement over why.2 Some
accuse platforms of too much content moderation and propose laws prohibiting
platforms from removing speakers or moderating content.3 Others accuse
platforms of too little content moderation and propose laws requiring platforms
to moderate particular types of speech.4
Both types of laws are likely to draw First Amendment challenges. The
prospect of these challenges has generated concern that current First
Amendment doctrine simply is not up to the task. The most prominent recent
advocates of this view are Justices Thomas and Alito.5 Justice Thomas stated
his position in his Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University concurrence.6 That case arose after then-President Donald Trump
blocked several Twitter users from his account because those users “post[ed]
replies in which they criticized the President or his policies.”7 They sued Trump
and several White House staff members, and the district court entered a
1. Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have a Mostly Negative Effect on the
Way Things are Going in the U.S. Today, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americans-say-social-media-have-a-mostly
-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-going-in-the-u-s-today/ [https://perma.cc/7HHV-77JM].
2. See Mark A. Lemley, The Contradictions of Platform Regulation, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 303,
305–10 (2021) (discussing contradictory proposals for regulating social media platforms); Clyde
Wayne Crews, Jr., Regulating Soåcial Media Content Moderation will Backfire and Make Big Tech
More
Powerful,
FORBES
(June
28,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2020/06/28/regulating-social-media-content-moderationwill-backfire-and-make-big-tech-more-powerful/?sh=12fb96f579ff [https://perma.cc/YS8C-2NLC]
(“The current social media debate centers around competing interventionist agendas. Conservatives
want social media titans regulated to remain “neutral,” while liberals tend to want them to eradicate
harmful content and address other alleged societal ills.”).
3. Lemley, supra note 2, at 308; Zoe Bedell & John Major, What’s Next for Section 230? A
Roundup of Proposals, LAWFAREBLOG (July 29, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-nextsection-230-roundup-proposals [https://perma.cc/QD5N-CK5N].
4. Lemley, supra note 2, at 307; Bedell & Major, supra note 3; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms
Have Editorial Rights?, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 97, 129 (2021) (referencing “proposals such as requiring
platforms to block more falsehoods and hate speech”) (citing Davey Alba, Facebook Must Better
Police Online Hate, State Attorneys General Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2020, at B4.).
5. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021);
NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715–16 (2022).
6. 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221 (2021).
7. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141
S. Ct. 1220 (2021).
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declaratory judgment that “the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the
[account] because of their expressed political views violates the First
Amendment.”8 The Second Circuit affirmed,9 but after President Biden’s
election, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision and
remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.10
Justice Thomas began his concurrence by expressing his discomfort with
“say[ing] that something is a government forum when a private company has
unrestricted authority to do away with it.”11 But his concurrence reached more
broadly by questioning how existing doctrines concerning common carriers,
places of public accommodation, and government coercion of private speech
might permit regulation of social media platforms.12 Although those broader
issues were not raised in the underlying litigation, Justice Thomas wrote that
“this petition highlights the principal legal difficulty that surrounds digital
platforms—namely, that applying old doctrines to new digital platforms is
rarely straightforward.”13 He continued,
[t]oday’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically
unprecedented amounts of speech, including speech by
government actors. Also unprecedented, however, is the
concentrated control of so much speech in the hands of a few
private parties. We will soon have no choice but to address how
our legal doctrines apply to highly concentrated, privately
owned information infrastructure such as digital platforms.14
8. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 579 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
9. “We . . . conclude . . . that the First Amendment does not permit a public official who utilizes
a social media account for all manner of official purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise–open
online dialogue because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.” Knight First Amend.
Inst., 928 F.3d at 230.
10. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. at 1220–21.
11. Id. at 1221.
12. Id. at 1224–27.
13. Id. at 1221.
14. Id. Justice Alito echoed these arguments in his dissent in NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, in which
the Court reinstated a federal district court’s preliminary injunction against a Texas law prohibiting
social media platforms from discriminating based on viewpoint. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142
S. Ct. 1716 (2022) (mem). Justice Alito—joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch—observed that “[i]t
is not at all obvious how our existing [First Amendment] precedents, which predate the age of the
internet, should apply to large social media companies.” Id. at 1717 (Alito, J. dissenting). Though he
indicated that he had not reached a definitive view on the legal issues, Justice Alito acknowledged the
state’s argument that social media platforms “possess some measure of common carrier-like market
power and that this power gives them an ‘opportunity to shut out [disfavored] speakers.’ ” Id. (first
quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995); and
then citing Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1223–24 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

REGULATION OF SPEECH INTERMEDIARIES

5

One reason why First Amendment doctrine is so challenging to apply to
platform regulation is that the doctrine developed over the course of many
decades in the context of a relatively simple mass communications ecosystem.15
That ecosystem involved predominantly one-way communication through print
media such as newspapers, magazines, and books; over-the-air broadcast media
such as radio and television; and wired media such as cable television.16 The
status of intermediaries such as booksellers and radio and television networks
introduced some complexity, but overall was relatively manageable.17
Today, however, our dynamic communications ecosystem presents a
thicket of conflicting speech interests. Digital age communication involves
seemingly unlimited channels of communications;18 broad democratization
driven by the low cost of communicating;19 a vast increase in the speed and
volume of communications;20 and increasingly sophisticated algorithmic tools
to filter and amplify speech.21 In this complex ecosystem, drawing analogies to
cases from the pre-digital communications era can prove challenging at best.22
15. See Jack M. Balkin, How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L.
71, 75 (2021) (“Twentieth-century print and broadcast media were not participatory media; the vast
majority of people were audiences for the media, rather than creators who had access to and used the
media to communicate with others.”). See generally, G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes
of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996).
16. See Balkin, supra note 15, at 75.
17. See id.
18. See Steven Levy, How the Propeller Heads Stole the Electronic Future, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sept. 24, 1995, at SM58 (stating that the internet is “based on unlimited channels of communication,
community building, electronic commerce and a full-blown version of interactivity that blurs the line
between provider and consumer”).
19. See James Boyle, Is the Internet over?! (Again?), 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 32, 60 (2019)
(arguing that the rise of the modern web “has been the greatest democratization of communicative
ability in the history of the species”).
20. See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1359
(2018) (noting the “ease, speed, and anonymity” of speech on contemporary communications
platforms); Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241, 293
(2015) (noting that, due to the digital revolution, “the volume, velocity, variety, and integration of
electronic communications were accelerating dramatically”).
21. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1636 (2018) (“The vast majority of [social media content]
moderation is an automatic process run largely through algorithmic screening without the active use
of human decisionmaking.”); id. at 1660 (“[P]latforms also have intricate algorithms to determine what
material a user wants to see and what material should be minimized within a newsfeed, homepage, or
stream.”).
22. Id. at 1609 (“Depending on the type of intermediary involved, courts have analogized
platforms to established doctrinal areas in First Amendment law—company towns, broadcasters,
editors—and the rights and obligations of a platform shift depending on which analogy is applied.”);
id. at 1602–03 (examining “how platforms are moderating user-generated content and whether that
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This Article attempts to clarify the analytical challenge by examining how
First Amendment doctrine has applied to the regulation of speech
intermediaries. As Jack Balkin recognized, “If you want to realize [the values
that free speech serves] . . . [y]ou need intermediate institutions that can create
and foster a public sphere. Without those intermediate institutions, speech
practices decay, and the public sphere fails.”23 However, because they occupy
chokepoints in communication from speaker to listener, speech intermediaries
are appealing targets for regulation, no matter what the regulatory goal.24
Attempts to regulate obscene, indecent, or otherwise objectionable speech often

understanding can fit into an existing First Amendment framework,” and arguing that “analogy under
purely First Amendment doctrine should be largely abandoned”); Heather Whitney, Search Engines,
Social Media, and the Editorial Analogy, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/search-engines-social-media-and-editorial-analogy
[https://perma.cc/LP63-EXA7] (“In debates over tech companies and free speech coverage, neither the
gravity of the policy stakes nor the complexity of the things being compared has dampened the
willingness of courts and scholars to use tenuous analogies in charting the way forward . . . . There are
multiple plausible analogies that might be used, each with different First Amendment implications, and
none tells us whether the normative considerations underlying free speech coverage for the one apply
to the other.”). But see Genevieve Lakier, The Problem Isn’t the Use of Analogies but the Analogies
Courts Use, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/
content/problem-isnt-use-analogies-analogies-courts-use
[https://perma.cc/QP2H-SN4T]
(“The
problem with the decision in Baidu need not be seen, therefore, as a consequence of the court’s reliance
on analogical reasoning per se. It is better understood as a consequence of the court’s reliance on an
overly formal analogy between newspapers and search engines, one that fails to take into account the
very different functions that newspapers and search engines play in the contemporary public sphere.”).
23. Balkin, supra note 15, at 78.
24. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
373, 378 (2010) (“Private intermediaries’ pervasiveness, combined with the extraordinary power they
wield over speech, make them attractive targets for regulators and litigants.”); see also NATASHA
TUSIKOV, CHOKEPOINTS: GLOBAL PRIVATE REGULATION ON THE INTERNET 7 (2017) (explaining that
rights holders want to work with macrointermediaries because they “act as chokepoints with the
capacity to exert significant control over the access to and use of essential online sectors, including
payment, advertising, search, marketplaces, and domain name services that enable users to access
websites”); Balkin, supra note 15, at 74 (“Governments and civil society groups often want to use basic
internet services and payment systems to go after propagandists, conspiracy mongers, and racist
speakers.”).
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target intermediaries such as the postal service,25 booksellers,26 broadcasters,27
cable television system operators,28 and internet service providers.29 In addition,
attempts to ensure that everyone’s voice is heard often try to leverage the
position of intermediaries such as newspapers,30 cable television system
operators,31 and social media platforms.32
Although past cases have rarely focused on the nature of the speech
intermediary, the presence of an intermediary raises the specter of an additional
speech interest that can make applying First Amendment doctrine more
complex. Clarifying the under-examined role of the speech intermediary can
help inform the application of existing doctrine in the digital age. The goal of
this Article is to articulate a taxonomy of speech intermediary functions that
will help courts (1) focus on which intermediary functions are implicated by a
given regulation and (2) evaluate how the mix of speaker, listener, and
intermediary interests should affect whether that regulation survives the First
Amendment challenge.

25. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736–37 (1878) (upholding law barring letters and circulars
concerning illegal lotteries from the mail); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub.
Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 409–16 (1921) (upholding law barring newspapers whose content
violated the Espionage Act from second class mail).
26. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (striking down municipal ordinance imposing
strict criminal liability on booksellers found in possession of books with obscene or indecent content).
27. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (upholding FCC determination that radio
broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue on a weekday afternoon violated prohibition
on broadcasting broadcast of indecent material).
28. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1996)
(upholding statutory requirement that cable system operators “segregate and block” sexually explicit
leased access channels, upholding statutory provision allowing cable system operators discretion to
prohibit programming depicting sexual or excretory activities in a patently offensive manner on leased
access channels, and striking down statutory provision allowing cable system operators discretion to
prohibit programming depicting sexual or excretory activities in a patently offensive manner on public
access channels).
29. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding FCC’s
order imposing net neutrality rules on broadband internet access service providers).
30. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down statute
providing political candidate the right to demand that newspapers who published story critical of the
candidate print the candidate’s reply).
31. Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 650–52 (1994) (“Turner I”) (upholding
law requiring cable television system operators to carry a limited number of broadcast channels).
32. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1231 (11th Cir. 2022) (affirming
preliminary injunction against enforcement of Florida law prohibiting social media platforms from,
inter alia, deplatforming or limiting the exposure of posts by political candidates; deplatforming or
limiting the exposure of the posts of journalistic enterprises; or applying its content moderation
standards unequally across users).
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Before articulating the taxonomy, the Article must address two
foundational issues. First, what is a “speech intermediary”? For purposes of this
Article, the term simply means one who facilitates the communication of
speech from one or more speakers to one or more listeners.33 Intermediaries
may facilitate speech in many different ways. They may pass it along
indiscriminately; they may decide which speech to pass along or which listeners
to target; they may pass along a digested version of the speech or attach their
own commentary to the speech; or they may collaborate with the speaker to edit
the speech before passing it along.
Second, we must distinguish two different ways that government may
attempt to regulate speech intermediaries: proxy-censor regulations and mustcarry regulations. Proxy-censor regulations impose censorship obligations on
intermediaries rather than directly censoring speakers.34 For example, the state
may prohibit broadcasters or cable system operators from carrying obscene or
indecent content.35 Or the state may prohibit booksellers from possessing
33. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1653 (1998) (defining “speech intermediaries” as “organizations engaged in
speech activity that stand somewhere between the individual and the state”); Kate Klonick, supra note
21, 1604 n.26 (“Internet intermediaries are broadly defined as actors in every part of the internet
‘stack.’ These include internet service providers, hosting providers, servers, websites, social networks,
search engines, and so forth.”) (citing JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW 31–32 (2016)); ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES 4 (Apr. 2010) (defining online intermediaries as entities that “bring together or
facilitate transactions between third parties on the Internet”); David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or
Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 382 n.18 (2010) (defining an intermediary
as “any entity that enables the communication of information from one party to another”); BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 833 (8th ed. 2004) (defining an intermediary as a “mediator or go-between; a thirdparty negotiator”); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 405 (2d ed. 1989) (defining noun “intermediary”
as “One who acts between others; an intermediate agent; a go-between, middleman, mediator.
Something acting between persons or things, a medium, means; also abstr. Action as a medium,
mediation, agency (of something) Something intermediate between others; an intermediate form or
stage.”); see also Note, The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the Marketplace of
Ideas, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1325 n.61 (2005) (noting that “Sullivan uses the term in its usual
application to membership organizations and the media, but the concept is equally appropriate in the
context of privatized public spaces”) (citing Sullivan, supra note 33, at 1653); Nicholas W. Bramble,
Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastructure, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 328 n.8 (2013)
(citing Klonick, supra note 21, at 1604 n.26); Ardia, supra note 24, at 382 n.18 (citing Black’s Law
Dictionary, supra note 33, at 833).
34. See Klonick, supra note 21, at 1608 (referring to “collateral censorship” as occurring “when
one private party, like Facebook, has the power to control speech by another private party, like a
Facebook user. Thus, if the government threatens to hold Facebook liable based on what its user says,
and Facebook accordingly censors its user’s speech to avoid liability, you have collateral censorship”).
35. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1996).
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obscene or offensive books.36 In contrast, must-carry regulations prevent
intermediaries from excluding speakers or from banning or restricting content.37
For example, the state might require newspapers to print the replies of political
candidates whom the newspaper criticized.38 Or the state might prohibit social
media platforms from censoring content based on political or ideological
reasons or from censoring the content of journalists.39
Proxy-censor and must-carry regulations differ in several ways relevant to
evaluating First Amendment claims by speech intermediaries. The first
difference involves how the regulations affect the total amount of speech. As
Frank Pasquale notes, proxy-censor regulations limit the amount of speech in
circulation, whereas must-carry regulations increase the amount of speech in
circulation.40 The second difference involves the potential conflict between the
intermediary’s speech interest and those of the primary speakers and listeners.41
As we shall see below, proxy-censor regulations are more likely to involve an
alignment between the intermediary’s speech interest and the speech interests
of the speakers who are censored and the listeners who wish to hear their
speech. In contrast, must-carry regulations are more likely to present a conflict
between the intermediary’s speech interest and the speech interests of the
speakers who would be excluded and the listeners who wish to hear their
speech.42
With those foundations in place, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
provides a taxonomy of the speech intermediary functions—conduit, curator,
commentator, and collaborator—and identifies for each the potential conflict or
alignment between the intermediary’s speech interest and the speech interests

36. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
37. See Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Online Account Termination/Content Removals and the
Benefits of Internet Services Enforcing Their House Rules, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 191, 193 (2021)
(referring to proposals limiting Internet services’ discretion to remove content or terminate users as “
‘must carry’ laws because they would require Internet services to provide services to users, and ‘carry’
user content, when the Internet service would otherwise choose not to”).
38. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244–45 (1974).
39. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1231 (11th Cir. 2022).
40. Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of
Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 487, 501 (2016). Pasquale also notes that must-carry
regulations are a governmental sovereign’s attempt to limit the power of a private “sovereign” to censor
private speech, although the other sovereign is merely a private entity rather than the governmental
sovereign to which the First Amendment was intended to apply. Id.
41. See Sullivan, supra note 33, at 1654 (“[W]hen government attempts to restrict the power of
private intermediaries to restrict speech, there are usually free speech interests on both sides.”).
42. For an argument that must-carry regulations would be disastrous for social media platforms,
see Goldman & Miers, supra note 37, at 214, arguing that must-carry regulations will lead to Internet
services being “overrun by terrible content” and “exit[ing] the user-generated content industry.”

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:1

of the speakers and listeners the intermediary serves.43 Next, Part III maps past
First Amendment cases onto the taxonomy and shows how each intermediary’s
function influenced the application of First Amendment doctrine.44 Finally, Part
IV illustrates how the taxonomy can help analyze First Amendment challenges
to proposed or potential regulation of contemporary speech intermediaries.45
II. A TAXONOMY OF SPEECH INTERMEDIARY FUNCTIONS
The intermediary functions are organized below according to the extent of
the intermediary’s expressive role. From the least expressive to the most, those
categories are: conduit, curator, commentator, and collaborator. This Part will
discuss the nature of each intermediary function, offer examples of each
intermediary function in practice, and examine how the intermediary’s speech
interest, if any, may inform the First Amendment analysis of attempts to
regulate that intermediary function.46 Before turning to each intermediary
function, however, there are several points to clarify regarding how to use the
taxonomy.
First, we must acknowledge that speech intermediaries can perform
multiple functions.47 Accordingly, for the taxonomy to be useful in any First
Amendment analysis, we must consider only the function that the regulation
addresses.48 For example, Facebook can act as a curator (by deciding which

43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. For a contrary argument that companies serving as speech intermediaries should not enjoy
independent First Amendment interests, see Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Silicon Valley’s Speech: Technology
Giants and the Deregulatory First Amendment, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 337, 357–60 (2021),
distinguishing companies’ attempts to vindicate their users’ First Amendment rights from companies’
flawed claims to their own First Amendment rights.
47. See TUSIKOV, supra note 24, at 6 (2017) (“Some intermediaries provide services across
multiple sectors. Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, for example, all operate search engines and digital
advertising platforms. Certain intermediaries, such as Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal, can be used in
both real world and online environments. Other intermediaries, like domain registrars, exist solely
online.”).
48. See Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers?, 1 J. FREE
SPEECH L. 377, 382, 408 (2021) (distinguishing First Amendment analysis constraints on social media
platforms’ “hosting” function from analysis of other functions such as “recommending” and
“conversation management” functions); Mailyn Fidler, The New Editors: Refining First Amendment
Protections for Internet Platforms, 2 NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING TECHS. 241, 243 (2021) (“First, the
role that a platform is playing in any given moment should determine whether editorial protections
operate . . . .”); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining
What the Freedom of Speech Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1702 (2011) (“A webpage that a
company creates is speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Note that this does not make the
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content to promote to which users), but it can also act as a commentator (by
attaching its own message to certain content, such as a message that has failed
a fact-checking process). For purposes of a First Amendment challenge, the
only intermediary function that should inform the analysis is the function that
the government is attempting to regulate.49
Second, we must assess the intermediary’s function based on the
intermediary’s standard business practice rather than on some deviation from
that standard practice. Otherwise, intermediaries could use their deviation to
“choose” a more favorable intermediary function. For example, Cloudflare, a
provider of essential but largely invisible internet services to its clients—“the
basic plumbing of the internet”—considered itself to be a “neutral utility
service.”50 However, controversy arose over providing its services to the
message board 8chan, which was a “breeding ground for violent extremists”
and had hosted advance announcements of three mass shootings in a six-month
period.51 Despite its neutral stance, Cloudflare’s CEO finally decided to stop
serving 8chan because 8chan had “proven themselves to be lawless and that
lawlessness has caused multiple tragic deaths.”52 If that decision to drop 8chan
had run afoul of a law imposing a nondiscrimination requirement on companies
like Cloudflare, the First Amendment analysis should not treat Cloudflare like
a company that screens its clients and decides who is and is not entitled to
receive their services. Instead, the analysis should treat Cloudflare as a
company that serves all prospective customers indiscriminately, because that
was its standard business practice.53 Conversely, if a message board about fly
company a speaker for all purposes: an oil-exploration company is engaged in speech when it creates
its webpage, but not when it drills for oil.”); see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Free Speech & Net
Neutrality: A Response to Justice Kavanaugh, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 855, 877–78 (2019) (contrasting a
“categorial” approach treating ISPs protected speaker in all cases from a “functional approach”
“assigns fixed First Amendment rights and duties to each distinct Internet service,” and with an
“editorial approach” basing First Amendment protection on “the actual exercise of content-based
editorial judgments”).
49. See Volokh, supra note 48, at 382, 408.
50. Evelyn Douek, The Lawless Way to Disable 8chan, ATLANTIC (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/how-disabling-8chan-became-cloudflaresjob/595606/ [https://perma.cc/B6U3-SGUM].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Christopher S. Yoo, First Amendment, Common Carriers, and Public Accommodations,
1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 463, 497 (2021) (“If an entity holds itself out as simply passing through speech
created by others and is not perceived as endorsing the messages contained therein, it is a common
carrier or public accommodation and not a speaker for First Amendment purposes. Conversely, . . . [i]f
they do exercise editorial discretion, they are not considered common carriers or public
accommodations with respect to those services, and those services fall outside the justification for
according lower levels of First Amendment protection.”).
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fishing only accepted users whom the message board host determined to be fly
fishers, a challenge to a regulation prohibiting the message board from
excluding prospective members should have to account for the message board’s
standard business practice of evaluating prospective members based on their fly
fishing experience.
A. Conduit
A “conduit” passes speech from one or more speakers to one or more
listeners without engaging with the speech in a way that conveys an expressive
message.54 Courts and commentators often juxtapose “neutral conduits” with
speakers and editors more deserving of First Amendment protection, thus
emphasizing the intermediary’s absence of engagement with the speech.55
Being a conduit does not mean that the intermediary exerts no influence on a
communication’s path from speaker to listener. But the conduit-intermediary
function does not attempt to influence or comment upon the message or choose
which listeners receive it.56 For example, a broadband internet access provider
may slow down the download speeds of companies’ services that compete with
its own.57 An internet service provider may filter out illegal material, like child
54. See Conduit, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conduit
[https://perma.cc/Z3X9-VTNM] (defining conduit to mean “a means of transmitting or distributing”).
55. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 575
(1995) (“Respondents contend . . . that admission of GLIB to the parade would not threaten the core
principle of speaker’s autonomy because the Council, like a cable operator, is merely ‘a conduit’ for
the speech of participants in the parade ‘rather than itself a speaker. But this metaphor is not apt here,
because GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council’s
customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of
presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974) (“A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising.”); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[The FCC’s net
neutrality order] includes only those broadband providers that hold themselves out as neutral,
indiscriminate conduits. Providers that may opt to exercise editorial discretion—for instance, by
offering access only to a limited segment of websites specifically catered to certain content—would
not offer a standardized service that can reach ‘substantially all’ endpoints. The rules therefore would
not apply to such providers.”); Benjamin, supra note 48, at 1686–87 (“Courts have placed common
carriers and other mere conduits at the opposite end of the spectrum from speakers, and have held that
conduits do not have free speech rights of their own.”); Rozenshtein, supra note 46, at 363 (“[S]peech
platforms constitute a spectrum, from hands-on publishers to neutral conduits”).
56. See Benjamin, supra note 48, at 1689 (“Mere transmission does not reveal an intent to convey
a message, and no message is likely to be understood.”); Volokh, supra note 48, at 408–09
(distinguishing social media platforms’ “hosting” function from their “recommendation” and
“conversation management” functions).
57. See Andrew Patrick & Eric Scharphorn, Network Neutrality and the First Amendment, 22
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 93, 96 n.11 (2015) (noting that the “FCC has cataloged instances
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sexual abuse material (CSAM)58 or material deemed to violate another’s
copyright.59 Even the United States Postal Service for many years precluded or
limited the carriage of obscene materials and lottery circulars,60 materials
encouraging the violation of federal law,61 and communist propaganda.62
However, as we shall see below, what distinguishes the conduitintermediary from the curator-intermediary function is the absence of an
expressive message. For example, if a courier service offered preferential
treatment to packages sent by or to its affiliates, a law outlawing such
distinctions would not raise First Amendment issues. In contrast, if a courier
service held itself out as delivering packages only between Republican or
Democratic supporters, the nature of the courier’s manipulation of the packages
it delivered would convey an expressive message—support for Republican or
Democratic causes—and would move the courier out of the conduitintermediary category and into the curator-intermediary category.63
Pre-digital examples of conduits include postal carriers and couriers,
telegraphs, and telephones, all of which transmit messages from a speaker to
one or more listeners without engaging with the content.64 But there are other
smaller scale examples of conduits beyond the traditional communications
industries. For example, a local print shop or copy center can serve as a conduit
for whatever content its customers wish to print. Even some self-publishing

of discrimination, which include a provider blocking online payment services after entering into a
contract with a competing service [and] a provider restricting the availability of competing streaming
video and VoIP services”).
58. Lauren R. Shapiro, Online Child Sexual Abuse Material: Prosecuting Across Jurisdictions,
24 J. INTERNET L., Oct. 2020, at 3, 4 (noting that ISPs “remove Web sites that host online CSAM”).
59. Natalia E. Curto, EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market and ISP Liability:
What’s Next at International Level?, 11 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 84, 94 (2020)
(noting that “some ISPs , such as YouTube, have implemented filtering mechanisms allowing the
detection and removal of infringing copyrighted content in cooperation with copyright owners”).
60. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878).
61. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 411
(1921).
62. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 303 (1965).
63. The example is adapted from Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and
Communicating: Determining What “The Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673,
1685–86 (2011), comparing FedEx hypothetically giving preferential delivery treatment companies
that pay more with a company transmitting to only Republican or only Democratic organizations.
64. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The First Amendment Issue of Our Time, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
INTER ALIA 1, 2 (2010) (“Conduits for communications—which we call ‘common carriers,’ [include]
telephone companies, the postal service, and telegraph companies of old.”).

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

14

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:1

presses may act as conduits, printing and binding books for their customers
without engaging in any way with the content.65
The digital age has brought a new cadre of conduits. Wireless telephone
companies provide traditional voice communications through a new medium.
Internet service providers use telephone lines, cable television lines, or satellites
to offer internet service to users across the globe.66 And many other companies
provide a host of largely invisible services that are essential for the internet to
function, such as cloud services, content delivery networks, and domain
registrars.67 But there are also digital conduits that operate on a smaller scale.
For example, digital self-publishing services allow anyone to publish an e-book
without any editorial intervention. Like pre-digital self-publishing houses and
copy shops, many of these digital printing presses differ from traditional
publishing houses in that they do not play any editorial role.68
Most of these conduit-intermediaries engage in some way with the content
they carry or transmit, but that engagement falls short of adding the
intermediary’s expressive message. For example, conduits may have terms of
service prohibiting certain uses of their facilities,69 but enforcing those terms of
service does not implement any expressive message on the intermediary’s
behalf.
Conduit-intermediaries may engage in other ways as well. For example,
internet service providers may decide to “throttle” the internet traffic they carry
based on the amount of data that certain customers have used, or they may
throttle the speed at which they deliver the traffic of services that compete with

65. See, e.g., About Us, LIGHTNING PRESS BOOK PRINTING, https://lightning-press.com/aboutus/ [https://perma.cc/5QAF-H7S8] (offering self-publishing services).
66. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
67. See Joan Donovan, Navigating the Tech Stack: When, Where and How Should We Moderate
Content?,
CTR.
FOR
INT’L
GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION
(Oct.
28,
2019),
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/navigating-tech-stack-when-where-and-how-should-wemoderate-content/ [https://perma.cc/5QM6-NNPF].
68. See,
e.g.,
Kindle
Direct
Publishing,
Content
Guidelines,
AMAZON,
https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/help/topic/G200672390 [https://perma.cc/3U5A-EGMP] (imposing
only “content guidelines” relating to “illegal or infringing,” “offensive, “ or “public domain” content,
or poor customer experience); Barnes & Noble Press, Author Membership Agreement, BARNES &
NOBLE
(Apr.
30,
2021),
https://press.barnesandnoble.com/legal/membership-agreement
[https://perma.cc/232P-L876] (requiring author’s representation that the work contains no infringing
content and is not obscene, libelous, or unlawful).
69. See, e.g., AT&T Acceptable Use Policy, AT&T.COM (July 28, 2017),
https://www.att.com/legal/terms.aup.html [https://perma.cc/E77V-BRHS]; Amazon Web Services,
AWS Acceptable Use Policy, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/aup/ [https://perma.cc/7UR4-NS9M];
Comcast Acceptable Use Policy, XFINITY, https://www.xfinity.com/support/ articles/comcastacceptable-use-policy [https://perma.cc/KV7D-LPX3].
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their own services, such as video.70 These practices convey no expressive
message; they simply advance the conduit-intermediary’s own business
interests.
In addition, many internet service providers filter out certain content from
their traffic, such as child sexual abuse material or material deemed to infringe
on another’s copyright.71 But, as with the other examples above, this alteration
lacks an expressive component that the internet service provider attempts to
convey to its users. It would be different, of course, if the internet service
provider marketed itself as a “family friendly” internet service provider and
only connected its users with sites it had deemed not to be obscene or indecent.72
That moderation would carry an expressive component that would implicate
the curator function described in the next section. But the distinguishing feature
of the conduit-intermediary is that the conduit does not engage with the content

70. See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 739–40; Madison River Comms., LLC, 20 FCC
Rcd. 4295 (Fed. Commc’n Comm. Mar. 3, 2005) (Order) (finding that a service provider blocked ports
on its network that were used by competing services, resulting in a consent decree and fine).
71. See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, In U.S. v Wilson, the Ninth Circuit Reaffirms Fourth Amendment
Protection for Electronic Communications, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 28, 2021),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/09/us-v-wilson-ninth-circuit-reaffirms-fourth-amendmentprotection-electronic [https://perma.cc/P2RG-Q3TR] (“Although federal law does not require private
parties to proactively search for CSAM, most, if not all major ISPs do, including Google . . . . Once
one of Google’s employees identifies an image as CSAM, the company uses a proprietary technology
to assign a unique hash value to the image. Google retains the hash value (but not the image itself),
and its system automatically scans all content passing through Google’s servers and flags any images
with hash values that match it. Once an image is flagged, Goggle’s system automatically classifies and
labels the image based on what it has previously determined the image depicts and sends the image
with its label to NCMEC, along with the user’s email address and IP addresses. NCMEC then sends
the images and identifying information to local law enforcement, based on the IP address.”); Open
letter from Academics and Individuals, NGOs and NPOS, and Companies to Andrus Ansip, Mary
Gariel, Vera Jouravá, Andrea Jelinek, Jeremy Godfrey, & Giovanni Buttarelli (May 15, 2019)
https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/20190515_EDRiOpenLetterDeepPacketInspection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X3WJ-589V] (“DPI allows IAS providers to identify and distinguish traffic in their
networks in order to identify traffic of specific applications or services for the purpose such as billing
them differently throttling or prioritising them over other traffic.”); How ISPs Block Websites,
FASTESTVPN
(May
7,
2020),
https://fastestvpn.com/blog/how-isps-block-websites/
[https://perma.cc/R9WP-WKTD] (discussing IP blocking to protect a website from hacking attempts,
DNS blocking “by filtering or blocking access to a particular website by restricting that site’s IP
address instead of the users. DNS blocking is rather straightforward and easy to surpass, in most cases
it could just be your firewall protecting you from malicious content”; and “Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) is a method which is known for inspecting the data or information transmitted between networks.
This is obviously a clear violation of privacy and internet security since all your content is being
watched over without your consent. Normally it is used within antivirus programs to detect malicious
content but it is also employed from the bigger ISPs to ensure thorough online censorship.”).
72. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 743; Benjamin, supra note 48, at 1702–03.
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in such a way as to convey its own message to its users. It thus falls short of the
curation function discussed in the following section.
Because the conduit-intermediary does not attempt to convey its own
message, attempts to regulate the conduit-intermediary do not raise any conflict
between the intermediary’s speech interest and those of the speakers and
listeners using the intermediary’s service. Thus, First Amendment analysis of
any regulation affecting the conduit-intermediary function should involve
straightforward application of existing doctrine.
There may, of course, be non-speech interests raised by the conduitintermediary function. For example, a proxy-censor regulation imposing
liability on a conduit-intermediary for transmitting certain content may lead the
conduit-intermediary to over-censor the speech it facilities in order to minimize
the risk of liability,73 which obviously conflicts with the interests of speakers
and listeners engaged in the regulated speech.74 This concern about chilling
effects, however, is present when any law attempts to deter or disincentivize
speech, so the conduit-intermediary’s interest should not unduly complicate the
First Amendment analysis.
Similarly, must-carry regulation of the conduit-intermediary function does
not require the consideration of conflicting speech interests because the
conduit-intermediary is not advancing a speech interest of its own. Must-carry
regulation could, of course, create a conflict between the conduitintermediary’s non-speech interests and the speech interests of its users. The
intermediary may have an interest in preserving capacity on its network, and
the must-carry regulation may threaten that network capacity.75 Or the
intermediary may have an interest in increasing its profitability.76 These

73. See Upstream Providers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/free-speech-weaklink/upstream [https://perma.cc/5HX6-SHB2] (“The further away from the user a service provider is
located on the chain, the less incentive that provider has to push back against censorship of the user’s
speech.”).
74. Of course, the interests of those speakers and listeners may be quite low where the regulated
speech is of low value or no value. For example, the proxy-censor regulation might prohibit the
intermediary from sharing child sexual abuse material or copyright infringing material.
75. See Jay Pil Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives, 41 RAND
J. OF ECON. 446, 447 (2010) (“ISPs such as Verizon, Comcast, and AT&T oppose network neutrality
regulations and claim that such regulations would discourage investment in broadband networks. The
logic is that they would have no incentive to invest in network capacity unless content providers
supporting bandwidth-intensive multimedia applications pay a premium for heavy Internet traffic.”).
76. See Emmanuel Lorenzon, Zero-rating, Content Quality, and Network Capacity, 16 INFO.
ECON. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2022) (“In a deregulated market, ISPs have incentives to depart from net
neutrality because they can generate additional revenues from CPs by offering benefits in return (e.g.,
prioritization of data or exemptions from users’ data allowance), attract new customers from the
network effects, and better discriminate among consumers on price and quality.”).
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interests could conflict with the interests of the speakers that the must-carry
regulation prevents the intermediary from excluding, as well as the interests of
listeners who wish to receive that speech. However, these non-speech interests
would not interfere with the application of existing First Amendment doctrine
to a regulation that does not undermine the conduit-intermediary’s speech
interests.
B. Curator
Intermediaries act as curators when they share or moderate the speech that
they carry in a way that involves some expressive component of their own.
They may limit what types of speakers may transmit content, what types of
content speakers may transmit, or which listeners will be shown which content.
The curator function finds support in dictionary definitions emphasizing the
intermediary’s selection of content for others to view.77 As described below,
scholars have also emphasized the expressive component of curation.
For example, in her seminal study of content moderation, Kate Klonick
quotes a YouTube employee describing the development of YouTube’s
content-moderation policy: “[Y]ou get to decide what the tone and tenor of your
platform look[] like, and that’s a First Amendment right in and of itself.”78
Intermediaries, of course, have multiple interests influencing how they
moderate content. Klonick reports that the developers of Facebook’s content
moderation policies balanced “free speech and democratic values . . . against
competing principles of user safety, harm to users, public relations concerns for
Facebook, and the revenue implications of certain content for advertisers.”79

77. “Curated” is defined to mean “carefully chosen and thoughtfully organized or presented.”
Curated, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ curated
[https://perma.cc/2G7Q-PMBT]. To “curate” is defined to mean “to select things such as documents,
music, products, or internet content to be included as part of a list or collection, or on a website.”
Curate, CAMBRIDGEDICTIONARY.COM, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ english/curate
[https://perma.cc/CT6B-MHLU].
78. Klonick, supra note 21, at 1626. Klonick notes that social media platforms “create rules and
systems to curate speech out of a sense of corporate social responsibility, but also, more importantly,
because their economic viability depends on meeting users’ speech and community norms.” Id. at 1625.
See also Volokh, supra note 48, at 409–10 (arguing that the case for treating social media platforms as
common carriers is strongest as to their “hosting” function, as compared to their “recommendation”
and “conversation management” functions); Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 111 (“[S]ocial media is not a
transparent conduit for speech such as a telephone system or ISPs. To the contrary, platforms famously
moderate content extensively, making constant, value-laden choices about what third-party content to
permit on their platforms.”).
79. Klonick, supra note 21, at 1626; see also id. at 1627 (“[T]he primary reason companies take
down obscene and violent material is the threat of allowing such material poses to potential profits
based in advertising revenue.”).
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Daphne Keller explains that even social media platforms’ amplification
algorithms have an expressive component.80 “Platforms that use algorithms to
rank user content effectively set editorial policy and ‘speak’ through ranking
decisions. The message conveyed can be pretty boring: Platforms say things
like ‘I predict that you’ll like this’ or ‘I think this is what you’re looking for.’ ”81
But platforms’ algorithms can also convey “more value-laden messages
expressed through up- or down-ranking” of user content.82 Keller compares
social media platforms’ expressive element to that of an anthologist who selects
a series of essays. The anthology is deemed a “distinct creative work under U.S.
copyright law . . . [and] receive[s] its own protection based on the anthologist’s
selection and arrangement of third-party speech.”83
Stuart Minor Benjamin also emphasizes the expressive component that
distinguishes the conduit from the curator.84 He explains that a “cable operator
that secretly blocked content for substantive reasons—say, indecency, or
positive references to its competitors—would be engaged in substantive
editing, but it would not have sent a message to its users and thus would not
have communicated that message.”85 However, Benjamin contrasted such a
conduit with “an [i]nternet access provider that explicitly provided a
substantively edited [i]nternet experience (e.g., a service that blocked access to
indecent material and presented itself as a ‘family friendly’ offering),” and
explained that this “family friendly” internet service provider would be a
speaker “[w]henever an [i]nternet access provider is willing not only to
substantively edit but also to make that editing clear—‘We block the content
you don’t want’ or ‘We edit the [i]nternet for you’—then it is engaged in speech
for First Amendment purposes.”86
The Supreme Court itself hinted at the curator category when recognizing
the expressive component inherent in even “the simple selection of a paid
noncommercial advertisement for inclusion in a daily paper.”87 The Court also
observed that “[c]able operators . . . are engaged in protected speech activities
even when they only select programming originally produced by others.”88
80. Daphne Keller, Amplification and Its Discontents: Why Regulating the Reach of Online
Content Is Hard, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 227, 247 (2021).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 260.
83. Id. at 248.
84. Benjamin, supra note 48, at 1701.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1702–03.
87. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995)
(citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 2454, 265–66 (1964)).
88. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (citing Turner Broad. Systems v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994)).

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

REGULATION OF SPEECH INTERMEDIARIES

19

We see many examples of the traditional conduit function in traditional
media. For example, bookstores choose which authors and titles to sell based
on what they believe their customers will want, and even position books on the
shelves and in the store in order to maximize customer response.89 Radio and
television broadcasters and cable television system operators decide what
channels to carry or what programs to air.90 Newspapers act as conduits when
they decide what letters to the editor or advertisements to publish, as long as
they do not edit the contents of the letters or advertisements.91
The curators who stand out more in contemporary debates, however, are
social media platforms and search engines. The early internet saw curators like
CompuServe, Prodigy, and AOL, which provided not only internet service but
a suite of content including chatrooms, message boards, email service, and
original content.92 The 1990s also saw the rise of search engines, with Google
eventually emerging as the dominant player in search.93 Search engines do more
than merely connect users with internet content for which they are searching.
Instead, as Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk observed, “[S]earch engine
results . . . are collections of facts that are organized and sorted using the
judgment embodied in the engines’ algorithms, and those judgments and
algorithms represent the search engine companies’ opinions about what should
be presented to users.”94 When they select and arrange materials from the web,
and then “add the all-important ordering that causes some materials to be
displayed first and others last, [search engines] are engaging in fully protected
First Amendment expression.”95

89. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–55 (1959).
90. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 726–27 (1978); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
91. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1005 (2008) (“Sullivan was a case about the Times as
intermediary, displaying another entity’s supposedly defamatory ad after only minimal screening.
What the actual malice standard protected was not the speech of the Times as such, but its business
model—accepting the speech of others with only limited fact-checking.”).
92. TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS
198–207 (2017).
93. WU, supra note 92, at 258; Richard Horvath, The History of Search Engines, THEE DIGITAL
(March
15,
2010),
https://www.theedigital.com/blog/history-of-search-engines
[https://perma.cc/N9VR-NAGS].
94. Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search
Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 890 (2014).
95. Id. at 891.
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Social media platforms engage in a host of curator functions.96 Most
platforms remove posts that violate their content moderation policies or remove
users from the platform if they violate the policy repeatedly.97 They also
amplify content that their algorithms predict will be most likely to engage other
users.98 Some platforms also influence what content users see by imposing
limits on how many times a message may be forwarded.99 Platforms also serve
advertisements to their users based on the content of the users’ profiles.100
Given the expressive component inherent in the curator-intermediary
function, regulating that function raises the possibility of conflicting speech
interests. This conflict is unlikely to arise, however, in the case of proxy-censor
regulations. A proxy-censor regulation would likely require the intermediary to
change its curation practices. If the regulation applied only to illegal or low96. They may also act as conduits (by, for example, letting one user send a message directly to
another) or commentators (by, for example, posting warnings about misinformation). See supra
Section II.A & infra Section II.C.
97. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 21, at 1636 (“Ex ante content moderation is the process that
happens in this moment between ‘upload’ and publication. The vast majority of this moderation is an
automatic process run largely through algorithmic screening without the active use of human
decisionmaking.”). One example is using “a picture-recognition algorithm called PhotoDNA” to
identify child pornography. Child pornography is illegal under federal law, so sites are obligated to
remove it. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2252A (2012)). In addition, “[P]otential copyright violations
can be moderated proactively through software like Content ID” which “allows creators to give their
content a ‘digital fingerprint’ so it can be compared against other uploaded content. Copyright holders
can also flag already-published copyright violations through notice and takedown.” Id. at 1637.
98. See Keller, supra note 80, at 263 (“Algorithmic ranking systems typically draw on aggregate
patterns within data sets reflecting human behavior, in order to predict what content users will want to
see in new situations.”). Keller defines “amplification” to include platform features “like recommended
videos on YouTube or the ranked newsfeed on Facebook, that increase people’s exposure to certain
content beyond that created by the platform’s basic hosting or transmission features. I will use the term
‘demote’ to cover any form of deamplification, including decreasing content’s algorithmic ranking or
excluding it from features like recommendations.” Id. at 231–32. “This definition . . . includes both
‘pull’ models like the search results a user requests from Google and ‘push’ models like YouTube
video recommendations.” Id. at 232. Examples of how platforms use amplification include “both
actions platforms take in response to specific content (like demoting news items identified as false by
fact checkers) and global algorithmic changes (like Google’s 2017 shift to reduce ranking of content
including ‘hoaxes and unsupported conspiracy theories’).” Id.
99. See, e.g., Jon Porter, WhatsApp Says Its Forwarding Limits Have Cut the Spread of Viral
Messages by 70 Percent, THE VERGE (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/27/
21238082/whatsapp-forward-message-limits-viral-misinformation-decline [https://perma.cc/QWE3VWRK] (“[A]ny message that’s already been forwarded by five or more people can now only be
forwarded to a single person or group.”).
100. See, e.g., Meta for Business, Ad Targeting: Help Your Ads Find the People Who Will Love
Your
Business,
META:
BUS.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting
[https://perma.cc/GYG9-UR7L] (describing “Core Audience” services allowing advertisers to target
users based on Meta’s information about the users “interests and hobbies” and “consumer behaviors
such as prior purchases and device usage”).
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value speech, the intermediary might have little if any speech interest in the
censored speech. Any broader regulation, however, would likely conflict with
the intermediary’s speech interest in its own curation practices—the very
practices that the government regulation was trying to change. In that case, the
intermediary’s speech interest would align with the interests of speakers whose
speech would be affected by the regulation and with the interests of listeners
who wish to receive that speech. In addition, as with a conduit, a curator facing
a proxy-censor regulation often has a non-speech interest in overcompliance to
avoid liability, and that non-speech interest would conflict with the speech
interests of those who use the conduit-intermediary’s service.101
On the other hand, a curator-intermediary confronting a must-carry
regulation will likely have its own speech interest in excluding the users or
content that the law requires it to carry. In that case, the intermediary’s speech
interest conflicts with the speech interests of the speakers whom the
intermediary would otherwise exclude or demote and with the users who wish
to hear from those speakers. Thus, applying existing First Amendment doctrine
will require courts to account for the interests of speech intermediaries which
may not have been accounted for when that doctrine evolved.
C. Commentator
An entity exercising the commentator-intermediary function attaches its
own message to the content it transmits from one user to another. The
intermediary may also engage in some form of curation, but the commentatorintermediary function is distinct from curation in that the commentatorintermediary publishes its own speech. One might argue that an entity
publishing its own speech is not an intermediary at all. However, what defines
the commentator-intermediary function is the fact that the intermediary both
carries the speech of others and appends its own message commenting on that
speech. Given public dissatisfaction about the state of digital communications
today, the commentator-intermediary function is increasingly likely to face
regulation.102

101. See Keller, supra note 80, at 240 (“Empirical research has documented considerable overenforcement by platforms taking down legal speech under [laws granting platforms immunity unless
they know about prohibited content] in order to avoid expense or legal risk for themselves.”). “The
problem is compounded by ‘heckler’s veto’ attempts by notifiers who submit false legal allegations to
platforms.” Id. at 240.
102. See supra Section I.
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We most often see social media platforms engage in the commentatorintermediary function when they attach their own labels to users’ posts.103
Facebook, for example, “began adding ‘Disputed’ tags to stories in its News
Feed that have been debunked by fact-checkers in December 2016. It used this
approach for approximately one year before switching to providing fact-checks
in a ‘Related Articles’ format underneath suspect stories.”104 Facebook itself
explains that it attaches a “sharing warning” when “someone tries to share a
post that’s been rated by a fact-checker”; issues a “sharing notification” if
“someone has shared a story that is later determined by fact-checkers to be
false”; and applies a “misinformation label” to “content that has been debunked
by fact-checkers.”105 The approach is similar at Instagram which, like
Facebook, is owned by parent company Meta.106 Twitter also labels tweets that
“contain[] misleading or disputed information that could lead to harm” by
“add[ing] a label to the content to provide context. For Tweets containing media
determined to have been significantly and deceptively altered or fabricated,
[Twitter] may add a ‘Manipulated media’ label.”107
103. See Jameel Jaffer & Scott Wilkens, Social Media Companies Want to Co-opt the First
Amendment. Courts Shouldn’t Let Them., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/12/09/opinion/social-media-first-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/U584-8PR3] (“Like other
media organizations, social media companies sometimes make decisions about which content to
publish, and they sometimes add their own voices to public discourse—as they do when they attach
labels to users’ posts.”).
104. Katherine Clayton, Spencer Blair, Jonathan A. Busam, Samuel Forstner, John Glance, Guy
Green, Anna Kawata, Awhile Kovvuri, Jonathan Martin, Evan Morgan, Morgan Sandhu, Rachel Sang,
Ranche Scholz-Bright, Austin T. Welch, Andrew G. Wolff, Amanda Zhou & Brendan Nyhan, Real
Solutions for Fake News? Measuring the Effectiveness of General Warnings and Fact‑Check Tags in
Reducing Belief in False Stories on Social Media, 42 POL. BEHAV. 1073, 1075 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09533-0 [https://perma.cc/6E3E-Z5KA] (“Our results indicate
that exposure to a general warning about false news modestly reduces the perceived accuracy of false
headlines. We also find that adding a ‘Rated false’ or ‘Disputed’ tag underneath headlines reduces their
perceived accuracy somewhat more.”).
105. How Facebook’s Third Party Fact Checking Program Works, META FOR MEDIA: BLOG
(June
1,
2021),
https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject/programs/third-party-factchecking/how-it-works [https://perma.cc/YZL6-SAAJ] (explaining that it also engages in curator
function by “show[ing] the piece of content lower in [its newsfeed], significantly reducing its
distribution” and reducing the distribution of “[p]ages, groups, accounts, or websites [that] repeatedly
share content that’s been debunked by fact-checking partners”).
106. How is Instagram Addressing False Information?, INSTAGRAM: HELP CENTER,
https://help.instagram.com/2109682462659451/?helpref=related_articles
[https://perma.cc/S4KBAZFM] (discussing “Making false information harder to find,” “Using technology to find the same
false information,” “Labeling posts with false information warnings,” and “Removing content and
accounts that go against community guidelines”).
107. Notices on Twitter and What They Mean, TWITTER: HELP CENTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/notices-on-twitter
[https://perma.cc/YCY3-MKC4]
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An entity engaged in the commentator-intermediary function has its own
speech interest in what it decides to say and not to say. Proxy-censor regulations
could target the commentary function by requiring warnings about false,
misleading, or offensive content, while must-carry regulation could prohibit
those types of warnings.108 Any regulation that affects the intermediary’s
decision to comment or not, or that defines what the intermediary must or
cannot say, would plainly affect the intermediary’s speech interest. The
intermediary’s speech interest would be unlikely to conflict with the interest of
its users because user speech would still be transmitted, regardless of whether
or not the intermediary adds its own commentary. Thus, courts are unlikely to
struggle with conflicting speech interests when analyzing First Amendment
challenges to regulation of the commentator-intermediary function.
D. Collaborator
Finally, we come to the collaborator function. An intermediary engages in
the collaborator function when it plays a role in generating or modifying the
speech that it transmits, in collaboration with another author. The collaborator
differs from the traditional speaker role only in the sense that there are multiple
speakers working together to produce the same content, one of which is the
speech intermediary. The Supreme Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston recognized that newspapers perform
the collaborator-intermediary function by observing that “the presentation of an
edited compilation of speech generated by other persons is a staple of most
newspapers’ opinion pages.”109 Similarly, the Court in Simon & Schuster,
(giving examples of warning labels, “Get the facts about COVID-19” and “Manipulated media”); see
also, About Birdwatch on Twitter, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/birdwatch [https://perma.cc/3RPN-X4AQ] (“We’re currently testing the option to allow people
to write notes that provide additional context on Tweets they believe contain misleading information.”).
108. See, e.g., Social Media NUDGE Act, S. 3608, 117th Cong. § 3 (2022) (proposing
regulations requiring social media platforms to implement “content-agnostic interventions”); FLA.
STAT. § 501.2041(2)(b), (2)(j) (2021) (prohibiting content-based censorship of journalists and defining
censorship to include “post[ing] an addendum to any content or material posted by a user”).
109. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995)
(citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)); accord David Shipley, What
We Talk About When We Talk About Editing, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/opinion/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-editing.html
[https://perma.cc/G93T-M6NX] (“But deciding what runs in Op-Ed is only part of what we do. We
also edit the articles that appear in this space.”). “Just like Times news articles and editorials, Op-Ed
essays are edited. Before something appears in our pages, you can bet that questions have been asked,
arguments have been clarified, cuts have been suggested—as have additions—and factual,
typographical and grammatical errors have been caught. (We hope.).” Id. (discussing editing grammar,
typographical errors, style, readability, clarity, transitions, usage, and length; fact checking and
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Inc. v. Members of New York State Crimes Victim Board recognized that a book
publisher performs the collaborator-intermediary function when the publisher
and author work together to produce the final published product.110
Like the commentator-intermediary, the collaborator-intermediary allows
for straightforward application of existing First Amendment doctrine because
both the intermediary and its collaborating partner share the same speech
interest in the speech they produce. To the extent that a proxy-censor or mustcarry regulation affects the collaborator-intermediary function, the
intermediary’s interest in producing that speech aligns with the interest of the
collaborating speaker and the listeners who wish to receive that speech.
Accordingly, courts are unlikely to struggle with conflicting speech interests
when analyzing First Amendment challenges to regulation of the collaboratorintermediary.
III. MAPPING FIRST AMENDMENT CASES ONTO THE TAXONOMY OF SPEECH
INTERMEDIARY FUNCTIONS
This Part will map past First Amendment cases onto the taxonomy of
speech intermediary functions. In the process, this Part will illustrate how the
intermediary’s function and the interests at play informed the First Amendment
analysis. In addition, this Part will identify situations where analyzing proxycensor regulations may differ from analyzing must-carry regulations depending
on the speech interests at issue. Proxy-censor regulation often places the speech

checking
assertions).
Accord
Media:
Op-Eds,
GEORGETOWN
UNIV.
LIBRARY,
https://library.georgetown.edu/scholarly-communication/faculty-media-op-eds
[https://perma.cc/RW4S-GLBB] (“Your editor will not ask you to change your opinion on your topic
but may suggest changes for clarity, flow, style, grammar, and length. You will be given the
opportunity to approve all changes before your op-ed is published. If you do not agree with the changes,
you can work with your editor to find a mutually agreeable solution, or, if that is not possible, it is
always an option to take back your article and submit it to a different publication.”); see also Marc
Tracy, James Bennet Resigns as New York Times Opinion Editor, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/07/business/media/james-bennet-resigns-nytimes-op-ed.html
[https://perma.cc/SPG2-UC6F] (taking responsibility for publication of “a much-criticized Op-Ed by
a United States senator calling for a military response to civic unrest in American cities,” and
acknowledging “a significant breakdown in our editing processes”).
110. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991) (“Whether the First Amendment ‘speaker’ is considered to be Henry Hill, whose income
the statute places in escrow because of the story he has told, or Simon & Schuster, which can publish
books about crime with the assistance of only those criminals willing to forego remuneration for at
least five years, the statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only upon speech of a particular
content.”); Zoe Sadokierski, How Publishing Works: a Book designer’s Perspective, CONVERSATION
(Sept. 28, 2014), https://theconversation.com/how-publishing-works-a-book-designers-perspective32211 [https://perma.cc/K2JC-WQCD]; Jane Winters, What Does an Author Want From a University
Publisher?, 31 LEARNED PUBL’G 318, 322 (2018).
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interests of the intermediary (if any) in alignment with those of the speaker and
listeners, which makes application of traditional First Amendment doctrine
straightforward. In contrast, must-carry regulations are more likely to place the
interests of the intermediary in conflict with the original speakers and their
listeners, and these conflicting interests can complicate application of the
doctrine.
A. Conduit
i. Proxy-Censor Regulations
Early examples of proxy-censor regulations of the conduit-intermediary
function involved the postal service. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries, the Court confronted challenges to Congressional limitations on what
could be sent through the mails. These changes, however, arose before the
development of the modern First Amendment doctrine,111 so the Court
summarily dismissed the First Amendment challenges to those regulations.112
As the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence developed throughout the
twentieth century, the Court applied meaningful scrutiny to regulation of the
mail. For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster General,113 the Court struck down
on First Amendment grounds a law prohibiting delivery of “communist
political propaganda” by mail unless the intended recipient submitted a card
asking to have such content delivered.114 The Court emphasized that requiring
111. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 308 (1996) (describing the emergence of
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence from World War I through the 1980s).
112. In Ex parte Jackson, for example, the Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge a
law prohibiting the postal service from carrying any “letter or circular” concerning lotteries, and
authorizing fines for anyone knowingly mailing such a letter or circular. 96 U.S. 727, 728 (1878). The
Court reasoned that the power of Congress to regulate what the postal service should carry had never
been questioned and that Congress had the power to exclude from the mails any “matter deemed
injurious to the public morals.” Id. at 732, 736; accord In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134–35 (1892)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge to federal statutes prohibiting lottery cards or advertisements
from the mail, and reasoning that “[t]he freedom of communication is not abridged . . . unless Congress
is absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not be carried in the mails, and
compelled arbitrarily to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment, through the
governmental agencies which it controls”). Similarly, in United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc.
Democratic Publ’g v. Burleson, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a law excluding
from the mails any materials that violated the Espionage Act of 1919. 255 U.S. 407, 416 (1921).
Brandeis previewed the subsequent evolution of First Amendment doctrine in his dissent in Burleson,
where he commented on the “danger[] to [the] liberty of the press . . . [of] the holding that the secondclass mail service is merely a privilege, which Congress may deny to those whose views it deems to
be against public policy.” Id. at 431–32 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
113. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
114. Id. at 303, 305.
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recipients to actively request communist political propaganda would have a
chilling effect, particularly for those in sensitive positions.115 Although the
Court did not discuss the postal service’s intermediary function, that would not
have changed the analysis because the postal service acted as a mere conduit
without any expressive interest of its own in the parcels it delivered, and
because the postal service is an independent agency of the federal government
rather than a private intermediary with its own private speech interest.
ii. Must-Carry Regulations
Must-carry regulations of the conduit-intermediary function enjoy a long
pedigree.116 Common carrier regulation of conduit-intermediaries, like
telegraph and telephone services, imposes an obligation to carry
communications without discriminating among them.117 “The Supreme Court
has defined a common carrier in the communications field as one that ‘makes a
public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of
the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit
intelligence of their own design and choosing . . . .’ ”118 A common carrier
“does not make individualized decisions in particular cases, whether and on
what terms to deal.”119
An early example of must-carry regulation of the conduit-intermediary
function appeared in the common carrier laws enacted to regulate telegraphs.
As Genevieve Lakier explained, from the mid-1800s through the turn of the
century, dozens of states as well as the federal government enacted laws
115. Id. at 307. For additional cases striking down limits on postal carriage on First Amendment
grounds, see, for example, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (striking
down, under commercial speech test, a federal regulation prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptives) and Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419–22 (1971) (striking down on
First Amendment grounds two statutory provisions authorizing the postmaster general to deny postal
services to purveyors of allegedly obscene materials).
116. Dawn C. Nunziato, The First Amendment Issue of Our Time, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
INTER ALIA, Dec. 2010, at 2; Lynn Becker, Electronic Publishing: First Amendment Issues in the
Twenty-First Century, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 819 n.96 (1985).
117. Nunziato, supra note 116, at 2 (“Conduits for communications—which we call “common
carriers,” such as telephone companies, the postal service, and telegraph companies of old—have long
been under a legal obligation not to discriminate against the communications they are charged with
carrying. The telephone company cannot refuse to connect your call because your conversation is racy,
nor can the postal service refuse to deliver your mail because it contains unpopular political
propaganda.”).
118. Lynn Becker, Electronic Publishing: First Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First Century,
13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 819 n.96 (1985) (first quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689, 701 (1979); and then citing Industrial Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (Fed. Commc’n
Comm. Oct. 5, 1966) (Report and Order)).
119. Becker, supra note 118, at 819 n.96.
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requiring that telegraphs “ ‘operate their respective telegraph lines as to afford
equal facilities to all, without discrimination in favor of or against any person,
company, or corporation whatever.’ ”120 In 1934, Congress passed “one of the
more important current common carrier laws, Section 202 of the
Communications Act of 1934, which prohibits telephone and telegraph
companies . . . from discriminating against consumers because of the content
of their speech, their identity, or any other irrelevant characteristic . . . .”121
These laws prohibited the intermediaries from “denying service to customers
because they dislike what the customers say or who they are” and from
“engaging in discriminatory pricing.”122
These late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century common carrier laws,
however, drew no meaningful First Amendment challenge because the modern
First Amendment had yet to evolve.123 Only relatively recently has the Court
considered a First Amendment challenge to a must-carry regulation affecting a
conduit-intermediary. As discussed below, the Court’s approach in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins124 and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights125 illustrates how the absence of an expressive message by
the intermediary distinguishes the conduit-intermediary function from the
curator-intermediary function.126 Both cases involved an intermediary who
facilitated the speech of others but did so in a way that did not involve any
expressive component on the part of the intermediary.
In PruneYard, a California shopping center brought a First Amendment
challenge to the California state constitutional requirement that the shopping
center allow members of the public to protest on its property.127 The shopping
center was “open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing
of its commercial establishments . . . [but] ha[d] a policy not to permit any
visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity, including the
circulation of petitions, that [was] not directly related to its commercial
purposes.”128 A group of high school students “set up a card table in a corner
of . . . [the] central courtyard. They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby
120. Genevieve Lakier, The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 2299, 2320 (2021) (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 2316–17.
122. Id. at 2317.
123. See White, supra note 111, at 308.
124. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
125. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
126. See Rozenshtein, supra note 46, at 365 (describing PruneYard and FAIR as examples of
“passive and pervasively available conduits for speech”).
127. 447 U.S. at 78–79.
128. Id. at 77.
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to sign petitions . . . .”129 A security guard informed the students that they had
to leave because they violated the shopping center’s regulations.130 The students
left and later sued to enjoin the shopping center from denying them access to
the shopping center for the purpose of circulating their petitions.131 The
California Supreme Court held that, under the California constitution, the
students had a right to “speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in
shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.”132 The shopping
center petitioned for certiorari on several grounds, including their claim that the
California Supreme Court’s order violated the shopping center’s First
Amendment rights.133
The Court rejected the shopping center’s reliance on two cases, only one of
which involved a speech intermediary. The Court first rejected the shopping
center’s reliance on the compelled speech case of Wooley v. Maynard, which
struck down New Hampshire’s requirement that its drivers display the state’s
“Live Free or Die” motto on license plates required by law to be attached to
private vehicle.134 The PruneYard Court distinguished Wooley for three
reasons: (1) the shopping center opened itself to the public as a place of business
rather than limiting itself to the owner’s personal use; (2) the California
Supreme Court ruling did not require that the shopping center display any
specific message on its property; and (3) “[t]he views expressed by members of
the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will
not likely be identified with those of the owner,” so the shopping center can
simply disavow any connection with any messages displayed on its property.135
The PruneYard Court also rejected the shopping center’s reliance on Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, which struck down a Florida law requiring a newspaper to
publish a political candidate’s reply to the newspaper’s prior critical
coverage.136 The Court distinguished Tornillo because of Tornillo’s concern
that the Florida statute could dampen public debate by deterring newspaper
from publishing controversial political content and interfering with the

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 78 (quoting Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979)).
133. Id. at 85.
134. 430 U.S. 705, 714–17 (1977). Maynard is not a speech intermediary case because the
individual was not using his license plate, or even his personal vehicle, to facilitate someone else’s
message. Id.
135. 447 U.S. at 87.
136. Id. at 88 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)).
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newspaper’s editorial function, whereas there was no such self-censorship
concern present in PruneYard.137
Thus, what was determinative for the PruneYard Court was the shopping
center’s role as a passive conduit with no independent speech interest. The
Court emphasized the facts that (1) the shopping center had opened itself up to
the speech of others, (2) the shopping center could disclaim any association
with the speech of its patrons, and (3) any influence that the shopping center
exerted over speech on its premises was not done with any expressive purpose
or effect.138
The Court also dealt with the conduit-intermediary function in Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, where it rejected a First
Amendment challenge that an association of law schools and law faculties
brought against the Solomon Amendment’s prohibition on federal funding for
universities that barred military recruiters from their campus.139 The
association, Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), consisted of
members which had adopted policies expressing their opposition to
discrimination based on a number of factors, including sexual orientation.140
FAIR members wished to restrict military recruiting on their campuses in
response to the congressional policy banning homosexual individuals from
military service.141 The Solomon Amendment prohibited the Department of
Defense from providing certain federal funds to any university “ ‘that either
prohibits, or in effect prevents’ military recruiters ‘from gaining entry to
campuses.’ ”142 The Department of Defense interpreted the policy to require
“ ‘universities to provide military recruiters access to students equal in quality
and scope to that provided to other recruiters.’ ”143 FAIR argued that this
“forced inclusion and equal treatment of military recruiters” violated their First
Amendment freedom of speech and association.144
The Court began its analysis by noting that, “[a]s a general matter, the
Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools
must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may

137. Id. at 88 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–58).
138. Id. at 87–88.
139. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
140. Id. at 52.
141. Id. at 52 (citing Act of Nov. 30, 1993, ch. 37, 107 Stat. 1670, repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Repeal of 2010, ch. 654, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3516).
142. Id. at 52.
143. Id. at 53 (quoting F. for Acad. and Inst. Rts., Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 283
(D.N.J. 2003)).
144. Id. at 53.

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

30

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:1

not say.”145 The Court then considered and rejected three arguments upon which
the Third Circuit had relied to find that the Solomon Amendment regulated
speech.146
First, although the law schools had to engage in some speech of their own
in order to comply with the Amendment, such as sending emails or posting
notices on behalf of military recruiters, such speech “is a far cry from the
compelled speech in [West Virginia Board of Education v.] Barnette and
Wooley [v. Maynard]” because the amendment “does not dictate the content of
the speech at all . . . and is only ‘compelled’ if, and to the extent, the school
provides such speech for other recruiters. There is nothing in this case
approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must
endorse.”147 The Court reasoned that
[c]ompelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for
other recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is simply
not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance, or
forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or
Die,’ and it trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and
Wooley to suggest that it is.148
Second, the Court distinguished prior cases “limit[ing] the government’s
ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker’s
message.”149 The Court distinguished all of those cases because in those cases,
the “compelled-speech violation . . . resulted from the fact that the complaining
speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to
accommodate.”150 Here, however, there was no such message.
“[A]ccommodating the military’s message does not affect the law schools’
speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and
recruiting receptions,” and “a law school’s decision to allow recruiters on
campus is not inherently expressive.”151 In addition, the Court reasoned,
“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by
recruiters . . . .”152 Thus, just as the mall owner in PruneYard could successfully
145. Id. at 60 (emphasis in original). The Court explained that, under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, “the Solomon Amendment would be unconstitutional if Congress could not
directly require universities to provide military recruiters equal access to their students.” Id. at 59.
146. Id. at 60–61.
147. Id. at 61–62.
148. Id. at 62.
149. 547 U.S. at 63 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 566 (1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986); and
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
150. Id. at 63.
151. Id. at 64.
152. Id. at 65.
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disclaim association with the activities of students circulating petitions, the law
schools could successfully disclaim support for the military’s policies.153
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the law school’s conduct bore
the expressive component necessary to trigger First Amendment protection.154
Before the Department of Defense adopted the equal access interpretation of
the Solomon Amendment, law schools treated military recruiters differently
from other recruiters by locating their interviews in different locations.155
However, the Court reasoned, such conduct on its own was not expressive; it
only became expressive when the law school accompanied it with speech
explaining the reason for treating military recruiters differently.156 “If
combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a
regulated party could always transform conduct in to ‘speech’ simply by talking
about it.”157
In summary, the Court in both PruneYard and FAIR relied on the absence
of an expressive component to justify treating the intermediary as a mere
conduit with no independent First Amendment interest. In Sections III.B and
III.D below, we will see the Court take a different approach to intermediaries
exercising the curator and collaborator functions by recognizing their
independent speech interest in its analysis, even if the analysis does not always
dictate favorable results for the intermediary.158
A recent First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s “net neutrality” policy
required the District of Columbia Circuit in United States Telecom Association
v. FCC159 to determine whether broadband cable access providers were mere
conduits or something more.160 The Federal Communications Commission’s

153. Id.
154. Id. at 65–66.
155. Id. at 66.
156. Id. If law schools had conveyed their own opinions about the military’s policies, they would
be engaged in the commentary function, and government regulation of that function would require a
very different First Amendment analysis. See infra Section III.C.
157. 547 U.S. at 66. The Court also considered and rejected the law school’s claim that the
Solomon Amendment violated their freedom of expressive association under the First Amendment. In
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–59 (2000), the Court upheld the Boy Scouts’ claim
that a state public accommodation law that required the Boy Scouts to accept a gay man as a
scoutmaster “would significantly affect [the Boy Scouts’] expression.” 547 U.S. at 68. The Court
distinguished the public accommodations law in Dale because “the Solomon Amendment does not
force a law school ‘to accept members it does not desire.’ ” Id. at 69 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 648).
Recruiters, the Court reasoned, are not part of the law school, but instead are outsiders who come to
campus for a limited purpose. Id. at 69.
158. See infra Sections III.B & III.D.
159. 825 F.3d 674 (2016).
160. Id. at 741.
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order in In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet,161 known as the
Open Internet Order,162 classified broadband service as a telecommunications
service subject to the common carrier regulations under Title II of the
Communications Act.163 The Open Internet Order promulgated several “open
internet rules,” including rules prohibiting broadband providers from engaging
in blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.164 The open internet rules
“generally bar[red] broadband providers from denying or downgrading enduser access to content and from favoring certain content by speeding access to
it. In effect, they require[d] broadband providers to offer a standardized service
that transmits data on a nondiscriminatory basis.”165 An association of internet
service providers, along with individual service providers and other related
litigants, challenged the 2015 Open Internet Order on various administrative
law, statutory, and vagueness grounds.166 In addition, broadband provider
Alamo Broadband and edge provider167 Daniel Berninger challenged the open
internet rules on First Amendment grounds.168
161. 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015).
162. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 695. The Open Internet Order was the latest in a series of
attempts by the FCC to “compel internet openness—commonly known as net neutrality—the principle
that broadband providers must treat all internet traffic the same regardless of source.” Id. at 689. The
D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s first attempt to impose net neutrality on the grounds that the FCC
failed to rely on any statutory authority to impose net neutrality. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642,
644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The FCC then relied on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
issue an order imposing various net neutrality requirements on broadband providers. U.S. Telecom.
Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 689. The D.C. Circuit vacated the anti-blocking and anti-discrimination
requirements “because the Commission had chosen to classify broadband service as an information
service under the Communications Act of 1934, which expressly prohibits the Commission from
applying common carrier regulations to such services.” Id. Under the Trump Administration, the FCC
rescinded its net neutrality rules, but at least one state has attempted to enact its own version of net
neutrality. See ACA Connects v. Bonta, 24 F.4th 1233, 1239, 1248 (9th Cir. 2022) (affirming district
court’s denial of motion for preliminary injunction based on federal preemption).
163. U.S. Telecom. Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 689.
164. Id. at 696. “The anti-blocking and anti-throttling rules prohibit broadband providers from
blocking ‘lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices’ or throttling—degrading or
impairing—access to the same. The anti-paid-prioritization rule bars broadband providers from
‘favor[ing] some traffic over other traffic . . . either (a) in exchange for consideration . . . from a third
party, or (b) to benefit an affiliated entity.’ ” Id.
165. Id. at 740.
166. Id. at 689.
167. Id. at 696. “[T]he internet has four major participants: end users, broadband providers,
backbone networks, and edge providers. Most end users connect to the internet through a broadband
provider, which delivers high-speed internet access . . . . Broadband providers interconnect with
backbone networks—‘long-haul fiber-optic links and high-speed routers capable of transmitting vast
amounts of data’ . . . . Edge providers, like Netflix, Google, and Amazon, ‘provide content, services,
and applications over the Internet.’ ” Id. at 690.
168. Id. at 739.
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The D.C. Circuit began its First Amendment analysis by noting that the
FCC had properly classified broadband service as common carriage.169 The
court then reasoned that “[c]ommon carriers have long been subject to
nondiscrimination and equal access obligations akin to those imposed by the
rules without raising any First Amendment question. Those obligations affect a
common carrier’s neutral transmission of others’ speech, not a carrier’s
communication of its own message.”170 The court reasoned that common
carriers hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately, and that the
open internet rules merely required that neutral access.171 “Equal access
obligations of that kind have long been imposed on telephone companies,
railroads, and postal services, without raising any First Amendment issue.”172
“The absence of any First Amendment concern in the context of common
carriers rests on the understanding that such entities, insofar as they are subject
to equal access mandates, merely facilitate the transmission of the speech of
others rather than engage in speech in their own right.”173 Indeed, the FCC
found that broadband providers exercise little control over the internet and
allow end users “ ‘to access all or substantially all content on the internet,
without alteration, blocking, or editorial intervention.’ ”174 The FCC further
found that end users expect to obtain access to all content on the internet
“ ‘without the editorial intervention of their broadband provider.’ ”175 The FCC
concluded that broadband providers act as “ ‘mere conduits for the messages of
others, not as agents exercising editorial discretion subject to First Amendment
protections.’ ”176 Thus, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that broadband providers “are
not required to make, nor have they traditionally made, editorial decisions about
which speech to transmit . . . . In that regard, the role of broadband providers is
analogous to that of telephone companies: they act as neutral, indiscriminate
platforms for transmission of speech of any and all users.”177

169. Id. at 740.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 739 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (noting that speech interests in leased channels are “relatively weak because [the
companies] act less like editors, such as newspapers or television broadcasters, than like common
carriers, such as telephone companies”).
173. Id. at 741.
174. Id. at 741 (quoting In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd.
at 5869 ¶ 549).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 743.
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The D.C. Circuit recognized that, to the extent that a broadband provider
offered its own content, such as a news or weather site, the provider’s provision
of content would receive First Amendment protection.178 The court explained
that a broadband provider might “qualify as a First Amendment speaker” if it
“were to choose to exercise editorial discretion—for instance, by picking a
limited set of websites to carry and offering that service as a curated internet
experience.”179 However, as the court recognized, the FCC’s order “itself
excludes such providers from the rules” by defining “broadband internet access
service” to apply only to those “broadband providers that hold themselves out
as neutral, indiscriminate conduits.”180 Thus the 2015 Open Internet Order
would not apply to such providers.181 The court also noted that, not only do
broadband providers offer their services neutrally, but a subscriber using her
broadband service to access internet content “does not understand the accessed
content to reflect her broadband provider’s editorial judgment or viewpoint.”182
The court concluded, “Because a broadband provider does not—and is not
understood by users to—‘speak’ when providing neutral access to internet
content as common carriage, the First Amendment poses no bar to the open
internet rules.”183
Thus, as the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit opinions above demonstrate,
laws regulating the conduit-intermediary function do not implicate the
intermediary’s speech interest. Even if the intermediary interacts in limited
ways with the traffic it carries, that interaction does not involve an attempt to
convey any message to the intermediary’s users. Once courts recognize that a
law regulates the conduit-intermediary function, application of First
Amendment doctrine should not be complicated by conflicting speech interests.
B. Curator
i. Proxy-Censor Regulations
An early example of a First Amendment challenge involving the curatorintermediary function is Smith v. California.184 In Smith, the City of Los
Angeles passed an ordinance making it unlawful for any bookseller to “have in
his possession any obscene or indecent writing.”185 The ordinance did not
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 741–42.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 743–44.
361 U.S. 147 (1959).
Id. at 148.
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require knowledge of the book’s obscene or indecent nature; it instead imposed
strict criminal liability.186 The appellant, a bookstore proprietor, was convicted
for having in his bookstore a “book found upon judicial investigation to be
obscene.”187
The Court acknowledged the intermediary nature of the bookstore, noting
that “a retail bookseller plays a most significant role in the process of the
distribution of books.”188 The Court then relied on the significant deterrent
effect that strict criminal liability would have on the freedom of speech.189
Although obscene speech was not constitutionally protected, the strict liability
imposed by the ordinance “would tend seriously to [constrain non-obscene
speech] . . . by penalizing booksellers, even though they had not the slightest
notice of the character of the books they sold.”190 Because of the strict liability
standard, the bookseller “will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has
inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the
distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature.”191 “The
bookseller’s limitation in the amount of reading material with which he could
familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute criminal liability,
thus would tend to restrict the public’s access to forms of the printed word
which the State could not constitutionally suppress directly.”192
Thus, the bookseller’s status as a curator-intermediary figured prominently
in the Court’s decision. The ordinance imposing strict liability for possessing
obscene or indecent books was a proxy-censor regulation that attempted to
leverage the bookseller’s intermediary position in order to reduce the
dissemination of speech that the government disfavored. As such, the speech
interests of the intermediary aligned with the speech interests of its customers,
both of which favored the free distribution of books. This alignment of interests
is typical of proxy-censor regulation of intermediaries, and it makes applying
the First Amendment relatively straightforward.193 The proxy-censor regulation
created a conflict between the bookseller’s non-speech interest in avoiding
liability and the speech interests of the bookseller and its customers, leading to
the chilling effect that rendered the law unconstitutional. As we shall see below,
this “chilling effect” is less likely to appear in the analysis of must-carry

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–54.
See supra Section II.D.
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regulations, since overcompliance with a must-carry regulation would lead to
the intermediary sharing more speech, not less.194
Another case involving proxy-censor regulation of the curator-intermediary
function is New York Times v. Sullivan.195 Sullivan illustrates how
intermediaries can play multiple functions. A newspaper can be a primary
speaker when its own reporters and editors write and publish news stories.
However, a newspaper can also play the role of collaborator when it selects and
then edits op-ed pieces along with outside authors.196 In theory, a newspaper
could serve as a mere conduit if it allowed anyone to submit a classified
advertisement for publication. Finally, we come to the role that the New York
Times played in this case: a curator for content that advertisers wanted to
communicate to the Times’ readers.
Sullivan, a city commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, sued the Times
and four Alabama clergymen for defamation based on the publication of a fullpage fundraising advertisement titled “Heed Their Rising Voices.”197 The
advertisement described the non-violent demonstrations for civil rights in the
south as well as the “wave of terror” that they faced in response.198 The ad was
signed by the “Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for
Freedom in the South.”199
Sullivan claimed that several of the ten paragraphs in the advertisement
libeled him.200 There were a few admittedly incorrect statements in the
advertisement. For example, students demonstrated while singing the National
Anthem rather than “My Country ‘Tis of Thee,’ ” as the advertisement stated.201
Similarly, nine students were expelled not for leading the demonstration at the
Capitol, as the advertisement stated, but for demanding service at a lunch
194. See Pasquale, supra note 40, at 501 (noting that proxy-censor regulations limit speech,
whereas must-carry regulation adds to the sum total of speech). One exception, however, would be a
situation where the must-carry obligation arose in response to the intermediary’s decision to carry or
publish speech, which could prompt the intermediary to censor its own speech to avoid triggering the
must-carry obligation. See infra Section III.D (discussing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974)).
195. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
196. Shipley, supra note 109, Media: Op-Eds, supra note 109.
197. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 256.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 257.
200. Sullivan claimed that, since he was a city commissioner, references in the ad to actions
taken by the police (ringing a college campus, arresting Dr. King seven times) falsely implied that
Sullivan himself took those actions. Id. at 257–58. Similarly, he claimed that general statements
attributing conduct to an unspecified “they” falsely implied that Sullivan himself engaged in that
conduct. Id. at 258.
201. Id. at 258–59.
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counter in the county courthouse.202 In addition, the police did not actually
“ring” the college campus; the dining hall was never padlocked; and Dr. King
was arrested only four times, rather than the seven claimed in the
advertisement.203 Despite the attenuated nature of the libel claim, the jury
awarded $500,000 in damages against the clergymen and the Times, and the
Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.204
The Court described the process in which the Times advertising department
engaged in accepting the advertisement. The ad cost approximately $4,800 to
run.205 The ad agency that placed the ad with the Times included a letter from
the Chairman of the Committee, A. Philip Randolph, certifying that everyone
whose names appeared in the ad had given their permission, although the four
individual defendants testified that they had not authorized use of their name
and had been unaware of that use until after the advertisement was published.206
In addition, the Times’ Advertising Acceptability Department knew Mr.
Randolph to be a “responsible person” and followed its established practice by
relying on his letter.207
The manager of the Advertising Acceptability Department
testified that he had approved the advertisement because he
knew nothing to cause him to believe anything in it was false,
and because it bore the endorsement of “a number of people
who are well known and whose reputation” he “had no reason
to question.”208
No one at the Times attempted to confirm the advertisement’s accuracy.209
The Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama and
created the actual malice rule—the requirement that a public official may not
recover for defamatory falsehoods related to his official conduct without proof
that the defendant published the allegedly defamatory statement with actual
knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.210
Before reaching that issue, however, the Court first rejected Sullivan’s claim
that the First Amendment should not apply because the advertisement was
merely commercial speech.211 The Court reasoned in part that the advertisement
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260–61.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 279, 292.
Id. at 265.
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was not truly “commercial” within the meaning of the Court’s prior cases; the
Court also explained that the fact that “the Times was paid for publishing the
advertisement is as immaterial in this context as is the fact that newspapers and
books are sold.”212 To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, “would discourage
newspapers from carrying ‘editorial advertisements’ of this type, and so might
shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by
persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities . . . .”213 The
Court thus recognized the important intermediary function that the Times
served in facilitating the speech of these advertisers. And that intermediary
function went beyond acting as a mere conduit, because the Times had an entire
department committed to reviewing and determining whether to carry ads.214
Even today, the Times still has an Advertising Acceptability Apartment that
reserves the right to fact check claims by outside organizations and rejects ads
that are false, misleading, or fraudulent; promote illegal substances or
substances that can cause immediate bodily harm; incite violence; are
“gratuitously offensive on the grounds of race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or
sexual orientation”; contain inappropriate content; or contain editorial
sponsored by state-run media organizations.215
The Court confronted yet another proxy-censor regulation of the curatorintermediary function in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.216 The Pacifica
Foundation owned a network of radio stations, one of which broadcast a twelveminute monologue by comedian George Carlin titled “Filthy Words.”217 The
monologue related Carlin’s thoughts about words you could not say on the
public airwaves and included Carlin repeating each filthy word “in a variety of
colloquialisms.”218 A man driving with his young son on a weekday afternoon
heard the broadcast on the radio and wrote a letter complaining to the FCC.219
212. Id. at 266.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 260.
215. Advertising Resources, N.Y. TIMES: ADVERT., https://advertising.nytimes.com/resources/
[https://perma.cc/YRP6-ANN6] (click "Ad Acceptability Guidelines" dropdown button, then click
“Our principles” link) (“The Times’s Advertising Acceptability Department reserves the right to
review ads against established principles designed to ensure our standards are consistently met and
applied. The Times retains the right to decline an advertisement offered to us if it violates our
principles, our Advertising Acceptability guidelines, or if we determine that there is a separate reason
for us to do so. We require two or more business days to review all advertisements. Given the volume
of ads reviewed, we do not offer creative revisions for ads that do not meet our standards, nor are we
able to provide a detailed explanation when ads are declined.”).
216. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
217. Id. at 729.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 730.
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The FCC issued a declaratory order that Pacifica “could have been the subject
of administrative sanctions,” but it instead required the order to be associated
with the station’s license file as the basis for possible sanctions in the event of
subsequent complaints.220 The basis for the order was a federal statute
prohibiting the use of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communications” and another statute requiring the FCC to “encourage
the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”221 The FCC
reasoned that Carlin’s language was “ ‘patently offensive,’ though not
necessarily obscene,” and concluded that the inclusion of “words [that] depicted
sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner” in the early
afternoon, when children were undoubtedly in the audience, was “indecent and
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1464.”222
After holding that the FCC had the statutory authority to determine that the
filthy words broadcast was “indecent” within the meaning of Section 1464,223
the Court considered Pacifica’s constitutional challenges. The Court
emphasized that the broadcast fell within the First Amendment’s coverage
because it was not “obscene.”224 However, the Court noted that “the
constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such patently
offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every
context.”225 When considering whether the restriction was permissible in
context, the Court first noted that broadcast media receives the least First
Amendment protection because “broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans” and because “indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home.”226 In addition, “[b]ecause the broadcast
audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely
protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content.”227 Second, the
Court noted, “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read.”228 While other forms of expression like bookstores and theaters
can bar children from indecent content, broadcasters cannot do the same.229
Finally, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the FCC’s restriction, which
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id. at 731 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976); and then 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)(1976)).
Id. at 731–32.
Id. at 739–41.
Id.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 749–50.
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relied on a nuisance rationale and emphasized such factors as the time of day
when the indecent material was broadcast.230 Thus, the Court ultimately
reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the FCC’s order.231
Pacifica offers another illustration of the relatively simple task that courts
have when considering proxy-censor regulation of the curator-intermediary
function, because the curator-intermediary’s speech interest aligns with the
speech interests present in any First Amendment censorship case. Here, the
curation was the radio station’s choice of what programming to broadcast. The
radio station’s speech interest in curating a set of programming for its listeners
aligned with the speech interest of its listeners in hearing that programming.
There were, of course, some listeners who did not want themselves or their
children to be exposed to indecent speech during the day. But such a conflict is
always present when the government attempts to censor particular speech; the
presence of the intermediary does not introduce a new speech interest.
The Court evaluated another proxy-censor regulation of the curatorintermediary function in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium v. FCC.232 In a series of fractured opinions, the Court dealt with
challenges to three different portions of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection Act of 1992.233 For our purposes, we shall examine only the
requirement in Section 10(b) of the Act, which applied only to leased access
channels and required cable system operators to segregate “patently offensive”
programming on a single channel, to block that channel from viewer access,
and to unblock it within 30 days after a subscriber’s written request.234 Section
10(b) thus presented a classic proxy-censor regulation of a curatorintermediary—i.e., the cable system operator deciding what channels to carry
on its system.
Despite the fractured plurality opinions on other issues in the case, six
justices agreed that Section 10(b) violated the cable system operator’s First
Amendment rights.235 Although the government argued that the “segregate and
block” requirement was the least restrictive means to achieve its objective to
230. Id. at 750–51.
231. Id.
232. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
233. Id. at 732–33.
234. Id. at 735. The other sections at issue allowed cable system operators to choose whether to
allow or prohibit sexually explicit programming. Section 10(a) offered that choice as to “leased access
channels” reserved for commercial lease by parties unaffiliated with the cable system operator, and
Section 10(c) allowed that choice for “public access channels” required by local governments for
public, educational, and governmental programming. Id. at 734–35. The Court upheld Section 10(a),
id. at 753 (plurality), and struck down Section 10(c), id. at 766 (plurality).
235. Id. at 760.
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protect the children’s physical and physiological well-being,236 the Court
rejected the government’s contention for several reasons. First, the law used
another means—a so-called “scramble or block” requirement—for programing
on any unleased channels “primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented
programming.”237 In addition, the law required cable operators to honor any
subscriber’s request to block any channel to which they do not wish to
subscribe.238 The Court also noted the expectation that manufactures would
soon have to make television sets with so-called v-chips that would
“automatically . . . identify and block sexually explicit or violent
programming.”239 Finally, the Court noted evidence in the record about a
“lockbox” that would permit parents to lock out programs or channels that they
did not want their children to see.240 Given the absence of evidence why these
alternative means would not be adequate alternatives to Section 10(b)’s
segregate and block approach, the Court held that Section 10(b) was not
narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in protecting children and
therefore violated the First Amendment.241
As with the prior cases, Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium offers another example of a proxy-censor law regulating the
curator-intermediary function. Again, although the Court recognized the
intermediary’s speech interest, that interest was aligned with the traditional
audience interest in the free dissemination of speech, so the presence of the
additional speech interest did not complicate the First Amendment analysis of
whether the state’s interest was compelling and whether the regulation was
narrowly tailored to that interest.242

236. Id. at 754–55; Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102–385, §§ 2(10)(a) & (10)(c), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)).
237. Id. at 756 (emphasis in original).
238. Id. at 756.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 758.
241. Id. at 760; see also United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826–27 (2000)
(striking down proxy-censor regulation of curator-intermediary function—the requirement that cable
television operators time-segregate or fully block channels primarily directed to sexually explicit
programming—because there were less restrictive means available to accomplish the government’s
stated objective).
242. For an argument that existing First Amendment doctrine precludes a judicial focus on how
platform regulations affect user speech, and for proposals on how that doctrine could and should
evolve, see Kyle Langvardt, Can the First Amendment Scale?, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 273, 278, 302
(2021).
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ii. Must-Carry Regulations
The Court has reached a different result in First Amendment challenges to
must-carry regulation of the curator-intermediary function, as opposed to
proxy-censor regulation. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,243 the Court
considered a First Amendment challenge by cable system operators and
programmers to the Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992.244
In the years before the Act was passed, cable television systems enjoyed several
competitive advantages over broadcast television stations.245 First, cable
technology eliminated the signal interference sometimes present during overthe-air broadcasting.246 Second, cable technology could transmit many more
channels that were available through over-the-air broadcasting.247 Congress
found that cable operators enjoyed “undue market power” and had a financial
incentive to refuse carriage to broadcasters, drive more customers to cable, and
capture advertising revenue from broadcast stations.248 Congress passed the Act
because of its concern that, “unless cable operators are required to carry local
broadcast stations, ‘[t]here is a substantial likelihood that . . . additional local
broadcast stations will be deleted, repositioned, or not carried’ ” and that “ ‘the
economic viability of free local broadcast television and its ability to originate
quality local programming will be seriously jeopardized.’ ”249
The Act required cable systems over a certain size to “set aside up to onethird of their channels for [local] commercial broadcast stations that request
carriage.”250 Smaller cable systems were required to set aside three commercial
stations.251 The Act imposed similar requirements with regard to “local public
broadcast television stations.”252 The smallest cable systems would carry one
such station; medium-sized cable systems would carry between one and three;
and the largest cable systems would carry every local public broadcast
television channel requesting carriage.253
The Court began its First Amendment analysis with the undisputed premise
that cable system operators “engage in and transmit speech” because they

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I).
Id. at 630, 635.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 630–31.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 631–32.
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“ ‘exercis[e] editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in
[their] repertoire’ ” and therefore “ ‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide
variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats.’ ”254 Accordingly, they are
“entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment.”255 The present discussion of Turner I focuses on the Court’s
treatment of the cable system operators as a curator, rather than a mere conduit,
because of this expressive role.256
Despite recognizing the cable system operators’ speech interest, the Court
applied intermediate rather than strict scrutiny because the Act imposed only a
content-neutral constraint on the cable system operators’ speech.257 The Court
reasoned that the Act’s interference with their speech did “not depend upon the
content of the cable operators’ programming.”258 The Court further reasoned
that, to the extent that the must-carry requirements distinguished between
speakers (i.e., cable versus broadcast channels), “they do so based only upon
the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and not upon
the messages they carry.”259 Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the
Act’s underlying purpose was to promote favored speech over disfavored
speech.260 Although Congress noted that broadcast channels were an
“ ‘important source of local news[,] public affairs programming[,] and other
local broadcast services critical to an informed electorate,’ ”261 the Court
reasoned that Congress merely acknowledged that broadcast stations make a
valuable contribution, and not that broadcast stations were more valuable
speakers than cable stations.262
The Court also distinguished two prior cases applying strict scrutiny to
other must-carry regulations—the regulation of the collaborator-intermediary
function in Tornillo, and the regulation of a company publishing its own
254. Id. at 636 (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)).
255. Id. The Court also recognized, unsurprisingly, that cable programmers engage in speech
when they produce original programming. Id. And the Court’s description of cable operators
recognized that some cable operators also own cable programmers and produce some of their own
programming. Id. at 628–29.
256. See id. at 636.
257. Id. at 644, 653.
258. Id. at 644.
259. Id. at 645.
260. Id. at 649.
261. Id. at 648 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102–385, § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)).
262. Id. at 648–49. The Court remanded for the lower court because there were genuine issues
of material fact to be resolved that would bear on the application of the intermediate scrutiny test. Id.
at 668. The lower court subsequently found that the Act survived intermediate scrutiny, and the
Supreme Court affirmed. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 184, 224–25 (1997) (Turner II).

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

44

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[106:1

newsletter in Pacific Gas & Electric.263 The most obvious distinction was that
Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric involved content-based restrictions,
whereas the Act in Turner I was content-neutral.264 Although the Court could
have stopped there, the Court also reasoned that, in contrast to content
published in a newspaper, there was “little risk that cable viewers would assume
that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages
endorsed by the cable operator.”265 At first glance, this statement could appear
to undermine the Court’s earlier declaration that cable system operators
exercise editorial judgment when deciding what channels to include. However,
the Court was simply explaining why the Act’s requirement to carry some
broadcast channels would not interfere with the cable system operators’
editorial function.266 The Court noted that broadcasters had a legal obligation
to identify themselves once per hour and that broadcasters commonly
“disclaim[ed] any identity of viewpoint between the management and the
speakers who use the broadcast facility.”267 Thus, the Court reasoned that the
addition of broadcast channels would not interfere with the cable system
operators’ expression.268
The Court evaluated another must-carry regulation of the curatorintermediary function in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.269 The challenge
involved the FCC’s implementation of the “fairness doctrine,” which had been
defined in a long series of FCC rulings.270 A Pennsylvania radio station
broadcast a show by the Reverend Billy James Hargis.271 Hargis discussed a
book critical of Barry Goldwater, and in the course of the discussion alleged
that the author had been fired for making false charges against city officials,
263. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 653–657 (first citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974), and then Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986)). PG&E
was not an intermediary case because PG&E simply published its own newsletter in its monthly billing
envelopes, and the Court struck down a state requirement that PG&E include a private group’s own
content in its billing envelopes. 475 U.S. at 5–7.
264. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 655.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id. The Court also noted that, unlike the right of reply statute in Tornillo that gave
newspapers an incentive to self-censor, the Act would not cause any cable system operator to avoid
controversy by diminishing the free flow of information. Id. at 656. Finally, the cable system operator
exercised much more market power than the newspaper in Tornillo. The cable system operator enjoys
a gatekeeper role “over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the
subscriber’s home.” Id. Thus, a cable system operator can silence competing speakers in ways that a
newspaper cannot. Id.
269. 395 U.S. 377 (1969).
270. Id. at 369–71.
271. Id. at 371.
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had worked for Communist-affiliated publications, had defended notorious spy
Alger Hiss, and had attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the Central Intelligence
Agency.272 The author demanded free reply time, which the radio station
refused, and the FCC declared that the broadcaster licensed to operate the radio
station had failed to meet its obligations under the fairness doctrine.273 The
Court consolidated that case with a separate challenge to the FCC’s regulations
codifying the fairness doctrine.274
The broadcasters challenged the fairness doctrine rule on First Amendment
grounds.275 The Court started its analysis by recognizing that “broadcasting is
clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest.”276 This was the
entirety of the Court’s discussion of the broadcaster’s speech interest, but it is
consistent with treating a radio broadcaster as carrying out the curatorintermediary function by choosing which programs it chooses to air, similar to
the editorial function that the Court ascribed to cable system operators in Turner
I.277
The Court nevertheless held that the scarcity of the radio broadcast
spectrum justified the intrusion on the radio broadcasters’ speech interest.278
Given the scarcity of the radio spectrum, “only a tiny fraction of those with
resources and intelligence can hope to communicate by radio at the same time
if intelligible communication is to be had.”279 “Because of the scarcity of radio
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor
of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium.”280 The
Court emphasized that the “right[s] of the viewers and listeners” were
paramount, not the “right of the broadcasters.”281 The Court emphasized the
importance of speech concerning public affairs to self-government; the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences.”282 The Court concluded, “It does not violate the
First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400–01.
Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 390.
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frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time
and attention to matters of great public concern.”283
Red Lion and Turner I confirm the expressive aspect of the curatorintermediary function, but they offer an important lesson about how the curatorintermediary function can affect the analysis of must-carry regulations. Rather
than deny the importance of the intermediary’s speech interest, the Court in
each case pointed to a mitigating factor that required upholding the regulation
at issue—the scarcity of radio spectrum in Red Lion and the content-neutral
nature of the law in Turner I. In each case, the fact that the law regulated the
curator-intermediary function helped the Court identify that mitigating factor.
For example, in Red Lion, the only reason that the law at issue helped
alleviate the radio spectrum problem was the fact that it targeted the
intermediary chokepoint—the broadcaster who held the license to operate the
radio station.284 Had the regulated party simply been the programmer of the
radio show, the law could not have contributed to solving the scarcity problem,
so the scarcity rationale could not have justified the law’s limitation on
speech.285 Similarly, in Turner I, the only reason that the Court could determine
that the law was content-neutral was the fact that the law regulated the cable
system operator’s decision about which channels to make available to its
users.286 If the law had simply attempted to distinguish between different types
of programming (e.g., educational or news programming compared to
commercial programming), the law would have been content-based and subject
to strict scrutiny.287 Thus, while the speech of a curator-intermediary is not less
important, the presence of the curator-intermediary function introduces
complexities that are not present when the law directly regulates the primary
speakers or listeners.

283. Id. at 394. The Court also rejected the argument that the fairness doctrine would trigger
self-censorship by broadcasters on controversial public issues. Id. at 392–93. First, the Court
characterized the argument as “at best speculative.” Id. at 393. Second, the Court noted that “[t]he
fairness doctrine in the past has had no such overall effect.” Id. Finally, the Court emphasized that the
FCC has the power to insist that licensees “give adequate and fair attention to public issues” and that
licenses must be renewed every three years. Id. at 393–94.
284. Id. at 387–90.
285. See id.
286. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643–48 (1994).
287. See id.; accord Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 108 (“It is doubtful that [Turner] would have
come out the same way if the government had attempted to forbid operators from carrying particular
channels . . . .”); Langvardt, supra note 20, at 280 (“[I]t seems doubtful that the [Turner] Court would
have taken this approach if the FCC’s must-carry rules had required ideological balance rather than
carriage of local stations.”).
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C. Commentator
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a commentator-intermediary
case, the Court recognized the protected nature of the commentatorintermediary function in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, when it observed that law schools
were free to express their opposition to the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy.288 It rejected the law schools’ claims that the Solomon Amendment
violated their associational rights because “[s]tudents and faculty are free to
associate to voice their disapproval of the military’s message; nothing about the
statute affects the composition of the group by making group membership less
desirable.”289 Had the Solomon Amendment attempted to limit law schools’
commentary on the military’s policies, the Court would likely have reached a
different result.290
Several lower courts, however, have confronted recent legislative attempts
to regulate the commentator-intermediary function. Florida, for example,
enacted SB 7072 in an attempt to regulate social media platforms.291 Although
the bulk of SB 7072 regulates the platforms’ curator-intermediary function by
restricting content moderation, one provision also regulates the commentatorintermediary function.292 That provision prohibits platforms from censoring a
user’s content “in a way that violates this part”293 and defines “censor” to
include “post[ing] an addendum to any content or material posted by a user.”294
Thus, SB 7072 prohibits platforms from posting a fact check or other type of
content warning in any way that violates the statute’s requirements, two of
which are relevant here. First, platforms must apply censorship “in a consistent
manner among its users on the platform,” which would potentially prohibit
288. 547 U.S. at 69–70.
289. Id.
290. See id.
291. SB 7072 sought to prevent social media platforms from: deplatforming a political candidate
during an election, FLA. STAT. § 106.072 (2022), applying its “censorship, deplatforming, and shadow
banning standards [inconsistently] among its users on the platform,” id. § 501.2041(2)(b), using postprioritization or shadow banning algorithms for content posted by a user known to the platform to be
a political candidate, id. § 501.2041(2)(h), and censoring, deplatforming, or shadow banning “a
journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or broadcast,” id. § 501.2041(2)(j).
Florida’s legislature initially exempted from SB 7072 “any information service, system, Internet search
engine, or access software provider operated by a company that owns and operates a theme park or
entertainment complex.” Id. § 501.2041(1)(g) (2021) (repealed 2022). However, the legislature
repealed this exception after Disney executives publicly criticized another Florida law. See NetChoice,
LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing S.B. 6C, 2022 S., 2022C Sess.
(Fla. 2022)).
292. See FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(b) (2022).
293. Id. § 501.2041(2)(d).
294. Id. § 501.2041(1)(b).
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platforms from posting their own comments or warnings based on the content
of some users’ speech.295 And second, platforms cannot censor “a journalistic
enterprise based on the content of its publication or broadcast.”296
The district court entered a preliminary injunction against SB 7072 in its
entirety, reasoning that SB 7072 burdened the platforms’ speech and could
survive neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny.297 While the decision focused
mainly on the content-moderation restrictions—which implicate the curatorintermediary function298—the district court also noted the limitation on the
commentator-intermediary function.299 The district court distinguished FAIR
and PruneYard by emphasizing that SB 7072 “explicitly forbid[s] social media
platforms from appending their own statements to posts by some users . . . This
is a far greater burden on the platforms’ own speech than was involved in FAIR
or PruneYard.”300 Thus, the court distinguished the platforms’ commentatorintermediary function from that of the conduit-intermediaries in FAIR and
PruneYard.301 Ultimately, the district court relied on both the curatorintermediary and commentary-intermediary functions to find that the platforms
enjoyed First Amendment protection.302
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction against SB 7072’s
content-moderation restrictions but vacated the injunction as to most of the

295. Id. § 501.2041(2)(b); accord Rozenshtein, supra note 46, at 366 (arguing that SB 7072
“violates the First Amendment requirement that the public be able to accurately tell who supports what
speech and that platforms be able to express their own opinions”).
296. FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(j).
297. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 546 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1093 (N.D. Fla. 2021), aff’d
in part and vacated in part sub nom. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1203 (11th
Cir. 2022) (affirming preliminary injunction as to all provisions limiting content-moderation, affirming
preliminary injunction as to provision requiring detailed explanations of each content moderation
decision, and vacating the preliminary injunction as to most provisions requiring disclosures).
298. See NetChoice, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 1090 (“[Social media] providers routinely manage
[user] content, allowing most, banning some, arranging content in ways intended to make it more useful
or desirable for users, sometimes adding the providers’ own content. The plaintiffs call this curating or
moderating the content posted by users. In the absence of curation, a social-media site would soon
become unacceptable—and indeed useless—to most users.”).
299. NetChoice, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 1093.
300. Id.
301. See id.; see supra Section III.A.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of conduitintermediaries in FAIR and PruneYard).
302. See NetChoice, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 1093 (“The Florida statutes now at issue, unlike
the state actions in FAIR and PruneYard, explicitly forbid social media platforms from appending their
own statements to posts by some users. And the statutes compel the platforms to change their own
speech in other respects, including, for example, by dictating how the platforms may arrange speech
on their sites.”).
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mandatory-disclosure provisions.303 Like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the portions of SB 7072 limiting platforms’ ability to attach
their own addendum to user posts directly limited the platforms’ commentatorintermediary function.304 As the court explained, although platforms do not
create most of the content on their sites,
[P]latforms do engage in some speech of their own: A
platform, for example, might publish terms of service or
community standards specifying the type of content that it will
(and won’t) allow on its site, add addenda or disclaimers to
certain posts (say, warning of misinformation or mature
content), or publish its own posts.305
The Eleventh Circuit relied in part on that conduit-intermediary function to
distinguish FAIR: “As an initial matter, in at least one key provision, [SB 7072]
defines the term ‘censor’ to include ‘posting an addendum,’ i.e., a disclaimer—
and thereby explicitly prohibits the very speech by which a platform might
dissociate itself from users’ messages.”306
Texas passed a similar law, HB 20, which limits platforms’ contentmoderation practices and requires platforms to make disclosures about those

303. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1203 (11th Cir. 2022). The contentmoderation restrictions regulated the platforms’ curator-intermediary role. See id. at 1204–05 (noting
that “the platforms invest significant time and resources into editing and organizing—the best word,
we think, is curating—users’ posts into collections of content that they then disseminate to others”).
In contrast, the mandatory-disclosure provisions (with one exception discussed below) did not regulate
any intermediary function because they did not require the platforms to make (nor did they prohibit the
platforms from making) any disclosures linked to some else’s speech. Instead, the Court analyzed the
mandatory-disclosure provisions under the Zauderer test applicable to laws requiring commercial
actors to disclose purely factual and noncontroversial information about their products or services. Id.
at 1227 (citing Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). The court held that
all of the mandatory-disclosure provision were likely to pass Zauderer’s requirement that the provision
be reasonably related to the state’s interest and not unduly burdensome, except for one. Id. at 1230.
The law required platforms to provide users written notice within seven days of every contentmoderation action and to include in that notice a “thorough rationale” for the decision and a “precise
and thorough explanation of how the social media platform became aware” of the material. FLA.
STAT. § 501.2041(2)(d)(1), (3) (2022). Given that the platforms “remove millions of posts per day”
and would be subject to “millions, or even billions of dollars of statutory damages,” the Eleventh
Circuit held that it was “substantially likely that this provision is unconstitutional under Zauderer
because it is unduly burdensome and likely to chill platforms’ protected speech.” NetChoice, LLC, 34
F.4th at 1230.
304. NetChoice, LLC, 34 F.4th at 1218.
305. Id. at 1204.
306. Id. at 1218.
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practices.307 In one respect, HB 20 also appears to regulate the commentatorintermediary function through its ban on viewpoint-based censorship.308 Most
of HB 20’s definition of censorship targets the curator-intermediary function
by defining “censor” to mean to “block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize,
de-boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to . . . expression.”309 But the
censorship definition also includes to “otherwise discriminate against
expression.”310 One could reasonably interpret to “discriminate” against
expression to include posting commentary critical of that expression, such as a
fact check or warning about the nature of the content.311 The district court,
however, focused on HB 20’s regulation of the curator-intermediary function
and reasoned that HB 20’s limitations on the platforms’ content-moderation
practices impacted the platforms’ exercise of editorial discretion and was
unlikely to survive either strict or intermediate scrutiny.312 The Fifth Circuit
vacated the preliminary injunction, but it too examined only the way in which
HB 20 limited platforms’ ability to block or demote user content, rather than
their ability to publish their own commentary.313

307. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 143A.002(a) (2021) (prohibiting platforms from
censoring content based on viewpoint); id. § 143A.001(1) (defining to censor as to “block, ban,
remove, deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise
discriminate against expression”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 120.051(a) (2021) (requiring platforms
to disclose information about their “content management, data management, and business practices”);
Id. § 120.052(a) (requiring platforms to publish their “acceptable use policy”); id. § 120.053(a)
(requiring platforms to publish biannual transparency reports concerning, in the prior six-month period,
the number of instances in which the platform was alerted to illegal or policy-violating content,
including detailed information such as how many of each types of actions the platform took in
response); id. § 120.101 (requiring platforms to provide “an easily accessible complaint system” about
illegal content or activity on the platform or decisions by the platform to remove user content).
308. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 143A.002 (2021).
309. Id. § 143A.001(1).
310. Id.
311. See id.
312. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 573 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1109–10 (W.D. Tex. 2021). The District
Court found that the statute’s “disclosure and operational requirements”—which included
implementing a system of notice and appeal for content removals and creating a complaint procedure—
were likely to fail the Zauderer test. Id. at 1110. The court reasoned that the “disclosure and operational
provisions are inordinately burdensome given the unfathomably large numbers of posts on these sites
and apps” and that the severe sanctions for violating these provisions would chill the platforms’
protected speech. Id. at 1111–12.
313. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439, 448 (5th Cir. 2022) (reasoning that HB 20 did not
regulate platforms’ own speech because platforms do not engage in protected speech when they act as
mere conduits for the speech of others); id. at 495 (Jones, J., concurring) (same); id. at 503–07
(Southwick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that HB 20 regulated platforms’
speech because platforms engage in protected speech when they curate their users’ feeds).

SPENCER_21NOV22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

REGULATION OF SPEECH INTERMEDIARIES

51

D. Collaborator
One example of the Supreme Court addressing a proxy-censor regulation
of the collaborator-intermediary function appears in Simon & Schuster v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board.314 New York’s “Son of
Sam” law required “any entity contracting with an accused or convicted person
for a depiction of the crime to . . . turn over any income under that contract” to
the state crime victims board, to be held in escrow for five years to satisfy civil
judgments in favor of the crime victims as well as other creditors.315 This case
arose when the board became aware of the book contract between publishing
house Simon & Schuster and “admitted organized crime figure Henry Hill.”316
Hill entered into a contract with an author to write a book about Hill’s life and
entered into a publishing agreement with Simon & Schuster for the book that
was eventually published as Wiseguy.317 The book depicted “in colorful detail,
the day-to-day existence of organized crime, primarily in Hill’s first-person
narrative.”318 The book enjoyed favorable reviews and commercial success, and
was adapted into the film Goodfellas.319 When it learned of the book, the state
crime victims board determined that Simon & Schuster had violated the Son of
Sam law by failing to disclose its publishing contract with Hill and making
payments to Hill.320 The board ordered Simon & Schuster to pay to the board
all monies still owed to Hill; the board also ordered Hill to pay to the board all
monies he had received to date.321
Simon & Schuster sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaration that
the Son of Sam law violated the First Amendment and an injunction against
enforcement of the law.322 The district court and court of appeals found the law
to be consistent with the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.323
The Court recognized the collaborative nature of the relationship between
book publisher and author:
Whether the First Amendment “speaker” is considered to be
Henry Hill, whose income the statute places in escrow because
of the story he has told, or Simon & Schuster, which can
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

502 U.S. 105 (1991).
Id. at 109–10.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114–15.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id.
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publish books about crime with the assistance of only those
criminals willing to forgo remuneration for at least five years,
the statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only on
speech of a particular content.324
The Court therefore found that the statute imposed a content-based
restriction on speech and applied strict scrutiny.325 Though the Court
found that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring that
crime victims are compensated by those who harmed them,326 the Court
found that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest
because it was overinclusive.327
As was the case with proxy-censor regulations above, here the proxy-censor
regulation involved an alignment between the interests of the intermediary,
Simon & Schuster, and its partner in collaboration, Henry Hill. Thus, the Court
was free to apply existing First Amendment doctrine and the strict scrutiny that
accompanies content-based regulation of speech.
The Court has also considered must-carry regulation of the collaboratorintermediary function. For example, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, the Miami Herald printed two editorials critical of Tornillo’s
candidacy for the Florida House of Representatives.328 Tornillo demanded that
the Miami Herald print his replies pursuant to Florida’s “right of reply”
statute.329 Under that statute, a candidate whose character or official record was
assailed by a newspaper could demand that the newspaper print the candidate’s
reply, free of cost to the candidate.330 The newspaper’s failure to print the reply
constituted a first-degree misdemeanor.331 Tornillo sued, and the Miami Herald
argued that the right to reply statute violated its First Amendment rights.332 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the statute was consistent with the First
Amendment, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.333
The Court rejected the argument that the concentration of market power in
the hands of a relatively small number of newspapers justified the restriction on

324. Id. at 116.
325. Id. at 116–18.
326. Id. at 118.
327. Id. at 118, 121–23. The law was overinclusive because it applied to any work that mentioned
a crime, no matter how tangentially, and because it defined “criminal” to include anyone who admitted
to a crime in the work, even if they had never been convicted or accused of the crime.” Id. at 121.
328. 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974).
329. Id. at 244.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 245.
333. Id. at 245–46.
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speech.334 The Court then considered the law’s impact on the newspaper’s
speech interest.335 The Court noted that compelled printing of the reply
penalized the newspaper for its speech about a political candidate in three
ways.336 First, the newspaper would be put to the “cost in printing and
composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be devoted to
other material the newspaper may have preferred to print.”337 Second, the
prospect of being compelled to print a reply could lead newspapers to censor
the news and opinions that they publish in order to avoid controversy.338
Finally, compelled printing of the reply would interfere with the newspaper’s
editorial function because “[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or
conduit for news, comment, and advertising.”339 The Court continued, “The
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment.”340 Given these intrusions, the Court held that the right
of reply statute violated the Miami Herald’s First Amendment rights.341
We see in the Court’s rationale the effect that the law had on the
collaborator-intermediary function as well as on the newspaper’s primary
speech. When the newspaper publishes articles by its own reporters or
freelancers that it retains, the newspaper is not an intermediary. But when the
newspaper selects op-ed pieces for publication and works with authors to edit
their content, the newspaper engages in the collaborator-intermediary function.
The Court’s concern that the right of reply law would cause newspapers to
“censor the news and opinions that they publish” thus applied to both the direct
speaker function and the collaborator-intermediary function.342
Decades later, the Court dealt with another must-carry regulation affecting
the collaborator-intermediary function. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual
descendants of Irish immigrants alleged that the private organizers of the St.
Patrick’s Day parade violated Massachusetts’ public accommodations law by
excluding them from the parade based on their sexual orientation.343 The state
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 254.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256–58.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256–58.
515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995).
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courts held that the state public accommodations law prohibited the parade
organizers from excluding the group and rejected the parade organizers’
argument that the public accommodations law violated their First Amendment
rights.344
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
group’s argument that the parade organizer was “merely ‘a conduit’ for the
speech of participants in the parade ‘rather than itself the speaker.’ ”345 Instead,
the Court reasoned, “Rather like a composer, the [parade organizer] selects the
expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score
may not produce a particularized message, each contingent’s expression in the
[parade organizer]’s eyes comports with what merits celebration on that
day.”346 The Court noted that “every participating parade unit affects the
message conveyed by the private organizers,” and therefore the lower court’s
order “essentially require[ed] petitioners to alter the expressive content of their
parade.”347
The Court also distinguished the parade organizer from earlier
intermediaries exercising the conduit and curator functions. The Court
distinguished PruneYard because the shopping center was open to the public
and the solicitations would not be attributed to the owner, who could disclaim
any connection simply by posting signs.348 Thus, there was no risk that speech
by the shopping center’s visitors would affect the shopping center owner’s right
to speak because the shopping center’s decision to allow people onto its
property lacked any expressive message of its own.349 And the Hurley Court
also distinguished the parade organizer from the cable system operators in
Turner I. It was common practice for broadcasters to disclaim identity of
viewpoint with those who produce the programming, whereas “[p]arades and
demonstrations, in contrast, are not understood to be so neutrally presented or
selectively viewed.”350 Moreover, whereas a cable network’s programing
consists of “individual, unrelated segments” from which audience members can
choose, “each parade unit . . . is understood to contribute something to a
344. Id. at 563–64.
345. Id. at 575.
346. Id. at 574 (cited in Benjamin, supra note 48, at 1699). As Benjamin explains, “The parade
did not have a single, clear message, but—to use the parlance of Turner I—the parade’s organizers did
exercise editorial discretion through which they sought to communicate messages.” Benjamin, supra
note 48, at 1699.
347. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–73. The Court noted that this freedom was, however, subject to the
law of defamation. Id. at 574.
348. Id. at 579–80.
349. See id. at 580.
350. Id. at 576 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. V. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (Turner I)).
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common theme . . . and . . . the parade’s overall message is distilled from the
individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is perceived
by spectators as part of the whole.”351
The Court’s careful distinction from Turner I illustrates the difference
between a curator and a collaborator. The curator exercises editorial judgment
in deciding what speech to make available to listeners. Those listeners,
however, understand that the curator itself is not generating all of the content.
As television viewers switch channels and Twitter users scroll through tweets,
they may be limited to the speech that the curator decides to facilitate, but they
also decide for themselves what speech they wish to explore. In contrast, the
collaborator works together with the speakers whose speech it facilitates to
produce a cohesive speech product, like a parade or a newspaper op-ed.
Listeners who engage with that work enjoy the fruits of their combined labor
of two speakers, an “overall message” in which listeners perceive individual
pieces as “part of the whole.”352 The fact that the collaborator-intermediary’s
speech interest inheres in the unified whole makes it more likely that must-carry
regulation of the collaborator-intermediary function will face strict scrutiny
than must-carry regulation of the conduit-intermediary function.353
IV. APPLYING THE TAXONOMY TO EMERGING REGULATION OF SPEECH
INTERMEDIARIES
The goal of this Article’s taxonomy of speech intermediary functions is to
clarify the application of applying longstanding First Amendment doctrine to
emerging regulation of speech intermediaries. By identifying which
intermediary function and which type of regulation are at issue, courts will be
in a better position to identify potentially conflicting speech interests and reach
a result that best applies the doctrine. This Part previews that analytical task
with regard to several types of regulation: (1) laws imposing neutrality
obligations on social media platforms and on companies further down the
technology “stack”; (2) laws denying social media platforms immunity under
Section 230 for certain types of content; and (3) laws requiring social media
platforms to provide information or warnings intended to curb the online
manipulation and misinformation.

351. Id. at 576–77.
352. Id. at 577; accord Volokh, supra note 48, at 405 (distinguishing social media platforms
from newspapers, magazines, and specific television channels (as opposed to entire cable systems)
because the platforms do not provide listeners with an “aggregate speech product”).
353. See supra Section III.B.
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A. Neutrality Obligations for Social Media Platforms and Companies Further
Down the “Stack”
Florida and Texas were the first states to pass legislation requiring that
social media platforms apply their content moderation practices neutrally.354
Florida’s SB 7072 prohibits platforms from (1) deplatforming or moderating
political candidates, (2) moderating journalistic enterprises based on their
content, and (3) applying their content moderation standards inconsistently.355
Texas’ HB 20 prohibits platforms from censoring users’ expression or their
ability to receive the expression of others based on viewpoint.356 Senator Josh
Hawley suggested a similar approach in his proposed Stop Internet Censorship
Act, which would remove social media companies’ Section 230 immunity
unless an FTC audit found that the platform “does not moderate information
provided by other information content providers in a manner that is biased
against a political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint.”357 In light
of the publicity surrounding the refusal to provide services to conservative
social media platform Parler by the major cloud service platforms,358 such
neutrality legislation could also be proposed against companies further down
the technology “stack” than social media platforms. This section considers how
the speech intermediary functions would impact First Amendment challenges
to such regulation.
When this type of must-carry regulation targets companies on the lower
level of the technology stack, it will likely involve only the conduitintermediary function. Companies near the bottom of the stack provide services
which are invisible to most consumers but are essential to the internet’s
function.359 For example, cloud service providers such as Amazon Web
Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud offer users “a cloud-based
platform, infrastructure, application, or storage services.”360 “Content delivery
networks . . . speed up websites” and “provide protection from malicious
354. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, FREE SPEECH CHALLENGES TO FLORIDA AND TEXAS SOCIAL
MEDIA LAWS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10748
[https://perma.cc/3A9J-L5QR].
355. FLA. STAT. § 106.072 (2022) (SB 7072).
356. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 143A.002(a) (2021) (HB 20).
357. S. 1914, 116th Cong., § 2(a)(1) (2019).
358. See Jack Nicas & Davey Alba, Amazon, Apple and Google Cut Off Parler, an App That
Drew Trump Supporters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/
technology/apple-google-parler.html [https://perma.cc/NK3A-LXKS].
359. See Donovan, supra note 67.
360. What is a Cloud Service Provider?, MICROSOFT: AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/enus/overview/what-is-a-cloud-provider/ [https://perma.cc/8S5C-CXPH]; Cloud Functions, GOOGLE,
https://cloud.google.com/functions/#section-3) [https://perma.cc/B7UM-72NG]; AMAZON WEB
SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/46ET-GPMB].
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access attempts” such as distributed denial of service attacks.361 Without the
protection of a content delivery network, “websites are vulnerable to political
or profit-driven attacks.”362 And domain registrars facilitate the registration of
domain names (such as google.com) as well as the assignment of IP addresses
to those domain names, which make it much easier to find websites than
remembering numeric addresses.363
If a legislature enacted a neutrality requirement on cloud service providers,
content delivery networks, or domain name registrars, the First Amendment
analysis would likely mirror that in the D.C. Circuit’s net neutrality decision.
In United States Telecom Association v. FCC, the court held that broadband
internet service providers served as neutral conduits linking their customers
with information on the internet and were not engaged in their own
expression.364 The same analysis would apply to companies like cloud service
providers, content delivery networks, and domain name registrars. Those
companies are not attempting to convey any expressive message in the course
of their business. Although on rare occasions they might deny service to a
controversial user, like 8chan or Parler, in their standard business practices,
they do not present any expressive message to their customers.365 For that
reason, they act as conduit-intermediaries, like the internet service providers in
United States Telecom, and requiring neutrality in their decisions about which
customers to serve would not infringe on their speech.366
When neutrality obligations are imposed on social media platforms,
however, the regulations will target the platforms’ curator-intermediary
function. As discussed above, when the platforms decide what content to
promote, demote, and prohibit, they convey an expressive message, even if they

361. Donovan, supra note 67.
362. Id. For example, Cloudflare’s refusal to continue service to 8chan effectively silenced
8chan, at least temporarily. Id. But see Rachel Guy, Nation of Men: Diagnosing Manospheric Misogyny
as Virulent Online Nationalism, 22 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 601, 623 (2021) (“[I]n 2019, when the service
provider Cloudflare stopped supporting 8chan, one of the most heinous platforms of the manosphere,
Gab.com seamlessly collected thousands of new users a day, presumably from 8chan. And, 8chan was
back up and running on another domain just days later, under the moniker 8kun.”).
363. What is a Domain Name Registrar?, CLOUDFLARE, https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/
dns/glossary/what-is-a-domain-name-registrar/ [https://perma.cc/C9EP-ELG6] (“Domain names are
simply “alphanumeric aliases used to access websites; for example, Google’s domain name is
‘google.com’ and their IP address is 192.168.1.1.”); Donovan, supra note 67.
364. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 744 (2016).
365. See, e.g., Douek, supra note 50 (noting Cloudflare’s perception of itself as a “neutral utility
service”).
366. See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 744; accord Balkin, supra note 15, at 73 (arguing that
“enforcing non-discrimination rules” for companies providing “[b]asic internet services” should not
violate the First Amendment).
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are not delivering a single, unified speech product.367 So the First Amendment
analysis must account for the platforms’ speech interest, which conflicts with
the speech interests of the users whose content they would moderate, as well as
with the speech interests of other uses who wish to receive that content.368
The recent Texas and Florida laws restricting social media platforms’
content moderation have brought the curator-intermediary function into sharp
relief.369 The states passed the laws to prevent platforms from excluding or
minimizing the speech of certain users, but those laws infringe upon platforms’
freedom to curate the content they display to their users.370 How should the First
Amendment analysis account for these conflicting speech interests? The nature
of platforms’ curator-intermediary function should help locate the case along
the spectrum of past First Amendment cases.
The Eleventh Circuit partially adopted this approach in NetChoice, LLC v.
Attorney General of Florida, which affirmed the district court’s preliminary
injunction against Florida’s SB 7072, which restricted social media platforms’
ability to moderate content.371 The court recognized that PruneYard and FAIR
were distinguishable because the targets of the regulation in those cases were
not engaged in their own speech.372 Although the court did not use the term
conduit-intermediary, the court’s analysis recognized that PruneYard and FAIR
involved regulation of precisely that role.373
The remainder of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the content-moderation
restrictions conflated two different intermediary function—the curatorintermediary function at issue in Turner I and the collaborator-intermediary
function at issue in Tornillo and Hurley.374 The court described Tornillo,

367. See supra Section II.B.
368. See supra Section II.B.
369. See NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1203 (11th Cir. 2022) (“The
question at the core of this appeal is whether the Facebooks and Twitters of the world—indisputably
‘private actors’ with First Amendment rights—are engaged in constitutionally protected expressive
activity when they moderate and curate the content that they disseminate on their platforms.”). The
statutes also imposed disclosure obligations on the platforms. FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2) (2021); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 120.051 (2021). The Fifth Circuit upheld HB 20’s disclosure requirements
under the Supreme Court’s Zauderer test for compelled commercial speech. NetChoice, LLC v.
Paxton, 49 F.4th 439, 485–88 (5th Cir. 2022). The Eleventh Circuit upheld some of SB 7072’s
disclosure requirements and struck down others, also under the Zauderer test. NetChoice, LLC, 34
F.4th at 1230–31.
370. NetChoice, LLC, 34 F.4th at 1217; NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439, 503–07 (5th
Cir. 2022) (Southwick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
371. NetChoice, LLC, 34 F.4th at 1203.
372. Id. at 1215.
373. See id.
374. See supra Sections III.B.2 & III.D.
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Hurley, and Turner I as cases where private entities exercised editorial
judgment by deciding whether and how to disseminate third-party-created
content.375 But grouping these three cases together disregards the two different
intermediary functions involved in those cases. A newspaper engages in the
collaborator-intermediary function when it selects op-ed pieces for publication
and works with authors to edit their content.376 Similarly, a parade organizer
engages in the collaborator-intermediary function when it selects which units
may participate, because “the parade’s overall message is distilled from the
individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is perceived
by spectators as part of the whole.”377 In contrast, a cable television system
operator does not collaborate in the production of programming, nor does it
review the programs that will be aired; it simply decides what channels will be
available to subscribers.378 The failure to recognize this distinction and compare
the social media platforms to the cable system operators in Turner I overlooks
the different ways in which conduit-intermediaries and collaboratorintermediaries exercise what the court called “editorial discretion.”379
Like the social media platforms, the cable system operator in Turner I acted
as a conduit-intermediary, choosing what channels to include in its network and
make available to its subscribers.380 While the Court recognized the speech
interest of the cable system operator, it was the curator-intermediary nature of
that speech interest that allowed the Court to find that the law at issue was
content-neutral and therefore apply intermediate scrutiny.381 Although the
must-carry rules interfered with the cable system operators’ discretion to
choose what channels to carry, “the extent of that interference does not depend
upon the content of the cable operators’ programming.”382 That holding was
possible only because of the nature of the cable system operators’ speech
interest. They did not present a single expressive unit for users to peruse and
375. NetChoice, LLC, 34 F.4th at 1212. The court also included PG&E in the same discussion,
but PG&E was not an intermediary case because the utility company simply published its own
newsletter in its monthly billing envelopes, rather than facilitating anyone else’s communications. Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1986).
376. See supra Section III.D.
377. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 576–77
(1995).
378. See Turner Broad. Syst. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (reasoning that requiring cable
system operators to carry broadcast stations “would not impair cable system operators’ editorial
function” because there was “little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations
carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator”).
379. Id. at 643–44.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 642–47.
382. Id. at 644.
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experience, like a book, a newspaper, or a parade.383 If that had been the nature
of the cable system operator’s speech interest, then prohibiting the operators
from excluding broadcast channels would have imposed a content-based
restraint.
In theory, the same content-neutrality argument could apply to narrowly
drawn laws requiring neutral or nondiscriminatory content moderation by
social media platforms. Florida’s SB 7072 precluded such an approach because
its explicit prohibition against moderating certain content—speech by political
candidates and journalistic enterprises—rendered the law content-based.384 The
Stop Internet Censorship Act suffers from the same defect because it would
single out the platforms’ treatment of political content.385
Texas’ HB 20 prompted conflicting opinions on whether it affected the
platforms’ speech interests at all and whether the law was content-based or
content-neutral. HB20 prohibits platforms from moderating content based on
the user’s viewpoint or on the viewpoint represented in the content.386 In the
district court, the Western District of Texas treated the platforms as curators
when it preliminarily enjoined HB 20.387 The court found that platforms “curate
both users and content to convey a message about the type of community the
platform seeks to foster and, as such, exercise editorial discretion over their
platform's content.”388 Accordingly, prohibiting the platforms from applying
their content-moderation policies required them to alter the “expressive
content” of their messages and targeted their “editorial judgments.”389 The court
reasoned that HB 20’s prohibition on viewpoint-based moderation was contentbased because it singled out a class of speakers—large social media

383. Id.
384. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1223 (11th Cir. 2022); NetChoice,
LLC v. Moody, 546 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1093 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (“The Florida statutes at issue are about
as content-based as it gets.”); accord Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 126 (arguing that SB 7072’s “blatant
preference for politicians over the general public” foreclosed any neutral justification).
385. Stop Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong., § 2(a)(1) (2019).
386. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 143A.002(a)(1)–(2) (2021). HB 20 also prohibits
platforms from moderating content based on the user’s geographic location in Texas. Id.
§ 143A.002(a)(3). The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that the platforms did not challenge the ban on
geography-based moderation as a First Amendment violation. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th
439, 449 n.4 (5th Cir. 2022).
387. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 573 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1108–09 (W.D. Tex. 2021), stay of
preliminary injunction granted, 2022 WL 1537249 (5th Cir. 2022), stay of preliminary injunction
vacated, 142 S. Ct. 1715 (2022), preliminary injunction vacated, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022).
388. NetChoice, LLC, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 1109.
389. Id.
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platforms—and denied them the right to advance their own viewpoint through
content moderation.390
On appeal, however, two members of the Fifth Circuit panel took a different
view of the platforms’ intermediary function when they vacated the preliminary
injunction.391 Judge Oldham’s opinion for the court noted that “the Platforms,
unlike newspapers, are primarily ‘conduit[s] for news, comment, and
advertising.’ ” 392 For that reason, in Judge Oldham’s view, HB 20 did not affect
the platforms’ own speech, and the law therefore did not violate the First
Amendment.393 Judge Jones echoed this reasoning in her concurrence,
reasoning that the platforms “[f]unction[ed] as conduits for both makers and
recipients of speech” and therefore when they “prevent[ed] disfavored speech
from reaching potential audiences . . . they [were] not themselves ‘speaking’
for First Amendment purposes.”394
In contrast, Judge Southwick’s partial dissent characterized the platforms
as curator-intermediaries.395 “Platforms compile, curate, and disseminate a
combination of user-submitted expression, platform-authored expression, and
advertisements.”396 For that reason, when platforms engaged in content
moderation they were “exercising their editorial discretion.”397 Given this
understanding of the platforms as curator-intermediaries, Judge Southwick
opined that HB 20 regulated the platforms’ speech, that it should be subject to
at least intermediate scrutiny, and that it failed intermediate scrutiny.398
Judge Southwick’s dissent accurately captured the platforms’ role as
curator-intermediaries.399 In contrast, Judge Oldham’s opinion strained to
characterize the platforms as “exercis[ing] virtually no editorial control or
judgment.”400 This framing misses the mark. The platforms surely do not play
the same role that newspapers play when deciding which op-eds to print. But
Judge Oldham’s opinion wrongly assumes that there is no middle ground
between a conduit and a traditional newspaper editor. Instead, recognizing the
platforms’ curator-intermediary function creates the opportunity to apply
intermediate scrutiny, an approach better suited than strict scrutiny to account
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

See id. at 1110, 1114.
See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022).
Id. at 456 (quoting Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 416 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
Id. at 456–69.
Id. at 494 (Jones, J., concurring).
Id. at 496–97 (Southwick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 501–04.
Id.
Id. at 459.
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for the conflicting speech interests raised by platform-neutrality laws like HB
20.401
Once the platforms are understood to be curator-intermediaries, the most
apt comparison is to Turner I, where Congress required cable television system
operators to carry a limited number of local, over-the-air broadcast channels.402
To decide what level of scrutiny to apply, the Court considered whether the
must-carry law was content-based or content-neutral.403 The Court held that the
law was content-neutral because the law made no reference to the content of
the programming that would air on the cable television systems.404 And,
although the law distinguished between speakers, it did so “based only upon the
manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, [and] not upon
the messages they carry.”405 Similarly, HB 20 does not on its face ban the
platforms from moderating any particular viewpoint; it simply prohibits
platforms from moderating viewpoints that they disfavor.406 Such a law could,
therefore, be deemed content-neutral, in which case intermediate scrutiny
would apply.407 Courts will uphold a content-neutral law if it furthers an
401. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, The Fifth Circuit’s Social Media Decision: A Dangerous Example
of First Amendment Absolutism, LAWFAREBLOG (Sept. 20, 2022), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fifthcircuits-social-media-decision-dangerous-example-first-amendment-absolutism
[https://perma.cc/C3CR-SKYR] (“[The Fifth Circuit’s] holding that, to the extent [HB 20] does
implicate the First Amendment, the proper standard of review is intermediate scrutiny, is a promising
avenue for analyzing content moderation laws. Intermediate scrutiny is the closest that American law
has toward the flexible, fact-based proportionality review that is best suited to resolve the complex
questions of constitutional law and policy.”).
402. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630–31 (1994) (Turner I).
403. Id. at 642.
404. Id. at 643–44.
405. Id. at 645.
406. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 143A.002 (2021); NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49
F.4th 439, 480 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding in the alternative that HB 20’s platform-neutrality requirement
is content-neutral because it “in no way depends on what message a Platform conveys or intends to
convey through its censorship”).
407. See NetChoice, LLC, 49 F.4th at 480 (holding in the alternative that, assuming HB 20
implicated the platform’s speech rights, the law was content-neutral because “Section 7’s burden in no
way depends on what message a Platform conveys or intends to convey through its censorship . . . [and]
Section 7 applies equally regardless of the censored user’s viewpoint, and regardless of the motives
(stated or unstated) animating the Platform’s viewpoint-based or geography-based censorship”). The
platforms also argued that, even if HB 20 was content-neutral on its face, the Texas legislature’s
purpose in enacting HB 20 was to protect “conservative speech” on the platforms. Brief of Appellees
at 8, NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022) (No. 21-51178), 2022 WL 1046833. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that the platforms presented “no real evidence of the
Texas legislature’s alleged improper motives.” NetChoice, LLC, 49 F.4th at 482; accord NetChoice,
LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1224-25 (11th Cir. 2022) (rejecting the platforms’ argument
that legislators’ statements about the platforms’ perceived bias against conservatives rendered the
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important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression, and if the incidental restriction on protected expression is no greater
than is essential to further that interest.408
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, however, HB 20 should still fail. In
Turner II, when the must-carry rules affecting cable television system operators
returned to the Court, the plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s concurrence
recognized that the must-carry rules advanced the government’s interest in
“promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of
sources.”409 Although the must-carry regulations affected cable system
operators’ discretion by requiring them to carry some broadcast channels that
they might not have otherwise carried, that limitation did not relate to the
content or viewpoint of any speaker’s message.410 Instead, that restriction
focused on the medium, not the message, by requiring carriage of a small
number of local, over-the-air television channels.411 Accordingly, the
government’s multiplicity-of-sources purpose was unrelated to the suppression
of expression.412 In contrast, HB 20 directly targets the platforms’ own
viewpoints by preventing them from moderating viewpoints with which they
disagree. In Judge Southwick’s words, this restraint on the platforms’
expression “is both the purpose and the price” of HB 20, and HB 20 therefore
cannot survive intermediate scrutiny.413 The majority of the Fifth Circuit panel
disagreed and held that HB 20’s platform-neutrality mandate was unrelated to
the suppression of speech because its purpose was “to protect individual
speakers’ ability to speak.”414 That position, however, overlooks the Supreme
Court’s admonition that the government “ ‘may not burden the speech of others
in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.’ ”415 The Eleventh Circuit

entirety of SB 7072 content-based, regardless of whether particular provisions were facially contentneutral).
408. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
409. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (Turner II) (plurality opinion);
id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Court recognized two other purposes behind the must-carry
rules: “preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television” and “promoting fair
competition in the market for television programming.” Id. at 189 (plurality opinion).
410. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643–45.
411. Id.
412. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189–90; id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring).
413. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439, 504 (5th Cir. 2022) (Southwick, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226).
414. Id. at 483.
415. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578–79 (2011) (quoted in NetChoice, LLC, 49
F.4th at 504 (Southwick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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agreed with Judge Southwick that there is “no legitimate—let alone
substantial—government interest in leveling the expressive playing field.”416
The result might well be different, however, for laws that function like
traditional public accommodation laws by prohibiting platforms from
discriminating based on protected classifications such as race, ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation, religion, and even political affiliation.417 Such a case would
differ from Hurley, which struck down the nondiscrimination provision of a
state law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations. In Hurley,
where the parade organizer performed the collaborator-intermediary function,
the parade organizer had a speech interest in the parade carrying an overarching,
expressive message.418 In contrast, the social media platform does not have a
similar speech interest in a single, cohesive speech product.419 In contrast, the
platform’s speech interest is more atomized, consisting instead of an interest in
delivering content that will engage and interest its users.420 Accordingly, such
a nondiscrimination obligation in content moderation would likely not be
content-based, which would allow the analysis to proceed under intermediate
scrutiny as in Turner I. And under intermediate scrutiny, the state’s interest on
protecting against discrimination on traditionally protected classifications
would be unrelated to suppression of the platforms’ expression, allowing the
416. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1228 (11th Cir. 2022). This split
between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits could reach the Supreme Court. Florida’s Attorney General
has already petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and NetChoice recently filed an unopposed motion
seeking a stay of the Fifth Circuit’s decision while NetChoice seeks a writ of certiorari. Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, No. 22-277, 2022 WL 4467452 (Sept. 21, 2022); Appellees’ Unopposed Motion to
Stay the Mandate Pending Petition for Writ of Certiorari, NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, No. 21-51178
(Sept. 29, 2022), https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/NetChoice-CCIA-UnopposedMotion-to-Stay-Mandate_Sep292022_Filed-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM66-QTL3].
417. See, e.g., SAFE TECH Act, S. 299 117th Cong., § (2) (2021) (proposing an expansion of
the carveout from Section 230 immunity for “any action alleging discrimination on the basis of any
protected class . . . under any Federal or State law”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2022) (prohibiting
employer from “controlling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities or
affiliations of employees”); accord Volokh, supra note 48, at 384 n.17 (referencing laws that ban
“discrimination based on party affiliation” or “discrimination based on broader political beliefs”).
418. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 580-81 (1995).
419. See Volokh, supra note 48, at 405 (distinguishing platforms from newspapers, magazines,
and television channels because the platforms do not provide users with an “aggregate speech
product”).
420. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576–77 (stating that, whereas a cable network’s programing
consists of “individual, unrelated segments” from which audience members can choose, “each parade
unit . . . is understood to contribute something to a common theme . . . and . . . the parade’s overall
message is distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is
perceived by spectators as part of the whole”); Volokh, supra note 48, at 405 (arguing that newspapers
produce an “coherent speech product” while social media platforms simply engaged in hosting users’
posts do not).
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law to survive so long as the restriction on platforms’ curator-intermediary
function is no greater than what’s essential to further the state’s interest.
B. Social Media Platform Liability for Various Types of Harmful Content
Many proposals are in play to expand the liability of social media platforms
that host or amplify certain types of content. Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, social media platforms, like other “interactive
computer services,” may not be treated as the publisher or speaker of content
provided by an “information content provider” such as one of the platform’s
users.421 Section 230 contains a “carveout” from the immunity it provides and
leaves platforms liable for violations of federal criminal law, intellectual
property violations, violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, and certain civil and criminal sex trafficking offenses.422
Proposals to expand this immunity carveout to more types of content would
function as proxy-censor regulations affecting the platforms’ curatorintermediary function.423 The SAFE TECH Act, for example, would expand the
immunity carveouts for discrimination based on a protected classification;
stalking, cyberstalking, harassment, cyberharassment, or intimidation based on
specified protected classifications; and violation of “the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States,” or actions for wrongful death.424 Others have
proposed further expansion of the immunity carveout, to reach incitement to
violence, hate speech, and disinformation.425
Because the proxy-censor regulations would implicate the platforms’
curator-intermediary function, the platforms’ own speech interest in how they
curate their user experience would align with the interests of their users.

421. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See generally Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of FOSTA and
Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 279 (2018).
422. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). See generally Goldman, supra note 421 (discussing Section 230
immunity and carveouts).
423. See, e.g., Megan Anand, Kiran Jeevanjee, Daniel Johnson, Quinta Jurecic, Brian Lim, Irene
Ly, Matt Perault, Etta Reed, Jenna Ruddock, Tim Schmeling, Niharika Vattikonda, Brady
Worthington, Noelle Wilson & Joyce Zhou, All the Ways Congress Wants to Change Section 230,
SLATE (Mar. 23, 2021), https://slate.com/technology/2021/03/section-230-reform-legislativetracker.html [https://perma.cc/M2HB-7W4N]. On the other hand, carveouts for activities like
discrimination against protected classes would likely regulate only conduct, not speech, and would not
raise First Amendment problems.
424. SAFE TECH Act, S. 299 117th Cong., § (2) (2021).
425. HARV. KENNEDY SCH. MOSSAVAR-RAHMANI CENT. FOR BUS. & GOV’T: FACULTY
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2021-02, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: ON
REGULATING DISINFORMATION AND OTHER HARMFUL CONTENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA 7 (2021)
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/FWP_2021-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6H8-YUPN].
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Accordingly, analyzing a First Amendment challenge to such a regulation
would not involve conflicting speech interests. Instead, the First Amendment
analysis would proceed just as in any other attempt by the government to censor
particular categories of speech.
A law denying social media platforms immunity from liability for specific
types of speech would surely be content-based and therefore subject to strict
scrutiny. Demonstrating that the law was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest would be difficult indeed. The best chance of survival
would go to carveouts that apply to speech that furthers illegal conduct, which
is one of the arguments in favor of the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(FOSTA) and its expansion the Section 230 immunity carveout to include the
facilitation of sex trafficking.426 On the other hand, targeting undesirable speech
426. See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA), Pub.
L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (creating a new federal crime for knowingly facilitating or
participating in sex trafficking). For cases finding and articles arguing that FOSTA is consistent with
the First Amendment, see United States v. Martono, No. 3:20-CR-00274-N-1, 2021 WL 39584, at *1–
2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021) (“In this case, ‘promotes’ and ‘facilitates’ . . . do not stand alone and without
context. FOSTA specifically criminalizes owning, managing, or operating a computer service with the
intent to promote the prostitution of another person or the intent to facilitate the prostitution of another
person . . . . FOSTA does not obviously criminalize speech promoting prostitution
generally . . . . Thus, the Court determines here that the use of the word “promotes” in FOSTA does
not appear substantially to restrict protected speech . . . [and] the Court holds that it is not
unconstitutionally overbroad.”); Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 201
(D.D.C. 2018) (“Plaintiffs also insist that, by virtue of the language ‘own, manage, or operate an
interactive computer service,’ Section 2421A impermissibly targets speech. I disagree. It is black-letter
law that speech that ‘is intended to induce or commence illegal activities’ is not protected by the First
Amendment.”), rev’d 948 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on
Hum. Rel., 413 U.S. 376, 388–89, (“We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be
forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.”); Abigail W.
Balfour, Note, Where One Marketplace Closes, (Hopefully) Another Won’t Open: In Defense of
FOSTA, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2475, 2504 (2019) (“FOSTA does not violate the First Amendment because
the Supreme Court does not extend First Amendment protection to speech used to solicit crimes.”);
Alexandra Sanchez, FOSTA: A Necessary Step in Advancement of the Women’s Rights Movement, 36
TOURO L. REV. 637, 660 (2020) (“FOSTA has not restricted the use of any speech that advocates for
prostitution or sex-trafficking. Instead, FOSTA has restricted speech that is integral to commit the
crimes of prostitution or sex trafficking. FOSTA merely holds that online service providers are
accountable when their users engage in speech that is integral to commit a crime under federal law.”).
For arguments that FOSTA violates the First Amendment, see Scott Memmel & Christopher Terry,
Constitutive Choices: Section 230 and First Amendment Values Versus FOSTA and President Trump’s
Executive Order, 39 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 101 (2021) (“This paper argues that FOSTA is
unconstitutionally overbroad and implicates large quantities of protected speech, therefore failing to
survive strict scrutiny review.”); Emily Morgan, Note, On FOSTA and the Failures of Punitive Speech
Restrictions, 115 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 503 (2020) (arguing that FOSTA violates the First
Amendment); Lura Chamberlain, Note, FOSTA: A Hostile Law with A Human Cost, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2171, 2175 (2019) (arguing that FOSTA violates the First Amendment because of its overbreadth
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like misinformation and hate speech seems likely to fail, just as it has failed in
past cases involving hate speech and indecent speech.427 The presence of a
conduit-intermediary would not make it any easier for such a law to survive
strict scrutiny. On the contrary, the presence of a conduit-intermediary with an
incentive to over-censor to avoid potential liability only makes the law more
likely to violate the First Amendment.428
C. Mandatory Social Media Platform Notices and Warnings
Other proposed legislation takes a very different approach to the challenges
presented by social media platforms today. The Social Media Nudge Act
proposes a study of potential “content-agnostic interventions” that social media
platforms could implement to mitigate the viral spread of harmful content.429
The Act would also require the FTC to draft regulations specifying which
content-agnostic interventions social media platforms must implement.430 The
Act’s findings identify three different examples of content-agnostic
interventions: nudges to users such as “screen time alerts . . . which may reduce
addictive platform usage patterns and improve user experiences online”;
prompts to “help users identify manipulative and microtargeted
advertisements”; and alerts requiring users to read user-generated content
before sharing it.431
The inevitable First Amendment challenges to these interventions would
turn on whether each intervention fell within the relatively permissive Zauderer
standard applicable to requirements that commercial actors include “purely
factual and uncontroversial information” in their advertisements or

because its “criminalization of any internet discussion that ‘promotes or facilitates prostitution’
ultimately prevents consensual sex workers and their advocates from sharing health and safety
information—dialogue that constitutes protected speech,” and that “FOSTA could proscribe political
speech that advocates for more permissive legal treatment of prostitution”); Regina A. Russo, Note,
Online Sex Trafficking Hysteria: Flawed Policies, Ignored Human Rights, and Censorship, 68 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 314, 336–37 (2020) (arguing that FOSTA violates the First Amendment because it “is so
broadly-written that internet intermediaries do not know what is allowed and what is not,” which forces
online entities to “shutter[] websites completely or censor[] certain speech that could be dubbed as
‘promoting’ or ‘facilitating’ prostitution”).
427. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011); United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826–27 (2000); Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
428. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1959).
429. S. 3608, 117th Cong. § 3 (2022).
430. Id. § 4.
431. Id. § 2(4).
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packaging.432 Zauderer, however, only applies to regulation of commercial
speech.433 Determining whether the content-agnostic interventions regulate
commercial speech would require close attention to the platforms’ intermediary
function.
The platform users’ posts would not constitute commercial speech because
they neither propose a commercial transaction nor relate solely to the economic
interests of the users.434 Thus, the Zauderer test could not apply unless the
interventions were deemed to regulate some aspect of the platforms’ function
that could be deemed to involve commercial speech. The government’s
strongest commercial speech argument would be to analogize the portions of
the platforms on which the interventions would appear to product packaging or
in-store displays.435 This analogy would emphasize that the interventions
related solely to the platforms’ conduit-intermediary function, in which the
platforms lack any speech interest, and did not affect the platforms’ roles as
either curator-intermediaries or commentator-intermediaries.
Even if the interventions are deemed to relate to the platforms’ commercial
speech, Zauderer will not apply if that commercial speech is “inextricably
intertwined” with non-commercial speech on the platforms.436 Close attention
to the relevant intermediary function will help resolve this issue as well. The
Supreme Court considered this inextricably intertwined issue in Riley v.
432. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). Under Zauderer, such
labeling requirements are upheld unless they are unduly burdensome or not reasonably related to the
state’s interest. Id. at 651. If Zauderer did not apply, the regulations would fall under the Court’s far
stricter review of compelled speech.
433. Id. at 651.
434. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 427 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(defining commercial speech); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (same).
435. See Ent. Software Ass’n v. Balgojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651–53 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying
Zauderer to government requirement that businesses selling or renting sexually explicit video games
place a large “18” on the video game packaging and post in-store displays about rating system, and
holding that the requirement failed the Zauderer test); Video Software Dealers’ Ass’n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 965–67 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Zauderer to government requirement
that businesses selling or renting violent video games include a large “18” on the video game
packaging, and holding that the requirement failed the Zauderer test).
436. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Ordinarily, we would initially decide whether video game packaging constitutes separable
commercial speech or commercial speech that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with otherwise fullyprotected speech . . . . However, . . . the labeling requirement fails even under the factual information
and deception prevention standards set forth in Zauderer.”); see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of
N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 795–96 n.9 (1988) (assuming without deciding that “a professional’s speech is
necessarily commercial whenever it relates to that person’s financial motivation for speaking . . . we
do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with
otherwise fully protected speech”).
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National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina.437 In Riley, the state
required professional fundraisers to make certain disclosures when they were
soliciting donations for their charitable clients.438 The Court decided whether
the fundraisers’ commercial speech was inextricably intertwined with the noncommercial speech of the charities by examining “the nature of the speech
taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement thereon.”439 The
Court held that the fundraisers’ speech was inextricably intertwined with the
speech of the charities because “solicitation is characteristically intertwined
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech . . . and . . . without
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.”440
Framed in the terms of this Article, the Court determined that there was no way
to disentangle the fundraiser’s collaborator-intermediary function—passing
along the charity’s message—from the fundraiser’s direct solicitation.
In contrast to Riley, the content-agnostic interventions could be
disentangled from the platform users’ non-commercial speech. In Riley, the
same speakers—professional fundraisers—delivered the commercial and noncommercial messages in the same communications.441 In contrast, the three
types of interventions contemplated under the Nudge Act would be separable
from the platform users’ non-commercial speech. First, disclosures to users
about their own screen time would be distinguishable from users’ noncommercial speech. Second, unless the regulations were very poorly drafted,
mandatory prompts helping users identify manipulative and microtargeted
content would also be distinguishable from the users’ posts. Finally, even
reminders advising users to read content before sharing it would be separate
from the users’ posts. In each of these examples, the intervention would not
affect the platform’s curator-intermediary function because the platform
remains free to decide whether and how to distribute content to its users. Nor
would the intervention impair the platform’s commentator-intermediary
function because the platform remains free to publish its own commentary
about any of the content that it distributes to users. Finally, the interventions
would not even relate to the platform’s conduit-intermediary function because
the interventions would not prohibit the platform from transmitting the users’
posts.
In contrast to the hands-off approach of the Nudge Act, legislation that
restricts the platforms’ commentator-intermediary function would likely fall to
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

487 U.S. 781 (1988).
Id. at 786.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
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a First Amendment challenge. For example, as discussed above, Florida
prohibited social media platforms from censoring “a journalistic enterprise
based on the content of its publication or broadcast.”442 To “censor” includes
“post[ing] an addendum to any content or material posted by a user.”443 Thus,
posting a fact check or other type of content warning on a journalistic
enterprise’s post would violate the statute. This ban directly undermines the
speech interest inherent in the platform’s commentator-intermediary function.
The Eleventh Circuit properly upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction
of this and many other aspects of the Florida legislation in NetChoice, LLC v.
Attorney General of Florida because they could survive neither strict nor
intermediate scrutiny.444
V. CONCLUSION
Given the heated debates over whether and how social media platforms
should moderate content, we can expect to see more attempts to regulate the
platforms—both by limiting their ability to moderate content and by requiring
them to moderate more. The inevitable First Amendment challenges
accompanying these laws will require courts to apply longstanding doctrine to
a complex new digital communications ecosystem that flows through speech
intermediaries. This Article has offered a taxonomy of the speech intermediary
functions—conduit, curator, commentator, and collaborator—and identified for
each function the potential conflict or alignment between the intermediary’s
speech interest and the speech interests of the speakers and listeners the
intermediary serves. The Article has also mapped past First Amendment cases
onto the taxonomy and described how each intermediary’s function influenced
the application of First Amendment doctrine. The taxonomy presented above

442. FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(j) (2022).
443. Id. § 501.2041(2)(b).
444. NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1208 (11th Cir. 2022). Texas passed
a similar law which was also the subject of a First Amendment challenge. See NetChoice, LLC v.
Paxton, 573 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1108–09 (W.D. Tex. 2021), stay of preliminary injunction granted,
2022 WL 1537249 (5th Cir. 2022), stay of preliminary injunction vacated, 142 S. Ct. 1715 (2022),
preliminary injunction vacated, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022). Most of the law regulated the curation
function by limiting platforms’ ability to “block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize, de-boost,
restrict, [or] deny equal access or visibility to . . . expression.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 143A.001(1) (2021). However, to censor also included to “otherwise discriminate against
expression,” and one could conceivably interpret “discriminate against expression” to reach a
platform’s commentary on users’ posts. See id. § 143A.001(1). Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the parties
in their Fifth Circuit briefs discussed the possibility that HB 20 could restrict the platforms’ own
commentary. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022); Brief for Appellant, NetChoice,
LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022) (No. 21-51178), 2022 WL 717286; Brief for Appellee,
NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022) (No. 21-51178), 2022 WL 717286.
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will help courts analyze which intermediary functions are implicated by a given
regulation, whether the intermediary has a speech interest of its own, and
whether that interest conflicts with the speaker and listener interests that First
Amendment doctrine has evolved to protect, all of which will mitigate the
inevitable analytical complexities.

